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Introduction 
‘We hope that as the economy improves, and as we tell our story, and as more 
information comes out about why we did what we did, that people will appreciate and 
understand, that what we did was necessary; that it was in the interest of the broader 
public. It was a Main Street set of actions aimed at helping the average American.’ 
Ben Bernanke, 2014 
The term Quantitative Easing (QE) refers to a set of programmes undertaken by the 
Federal Reserve from 2008 to 2014. The programmes involved large scale expansion of 
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet through the extension of liquidity into American 
financial markets. The aim of this thesis is to directly challenge the narrative about the 
programme put forth by Bernanke: that QE supported liquidity in financial markets in 
order to benefit ordinary households. Instead, it will become clear that households 
benefited from QE only to the extent that they were able to participate in the support of 
finance. 
That such an understanding can follow from a study of Quantitative Easing would be 
surprising to those familiar only with the current orthodox literature on the subject. The 
orthodoxy operates from the ontological assumption that economic reality consists of 
markets which derive their efficiency from the population of rational agents which 
operate through them. From here the literature diverts in one of two ways. The first - 
accepting this ontological basis in full - operates with an idealised notion of the price 
mechanism. This leads to the conclusion that QE’s impact cannot be derived from 
changing the volume of certain asset types that financial agents hold. For, rational 
agents are only concerned with discounted future expected returns, which changes in 
quantity alone cannot effect. As a consequence, such theorists pose that programmes 
like QE work through an ‘expectations channel’ (Bauer & Rudebusch, 2014; Wallace, 
1981; Woodford, 2012). For, the very action of QE implies that the federal funds rate 
will remain near or close to the zero bound. This fosters the rational expectation that 
favourable financing conditions will continue for a long period of time. Such an 
expectation then fuels expansive investment. While this may seem like a promising 
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avenue of investigation, it is stymied by the fact that such analysis takes place with 
reference to the expectations of perfectly informed, rational agents. The result is an 
explanation of QE that fails to consider the influence of uncertainty on economic 
decision making. 
Some in the orthodoxy seek to adjust the ontological basis of efficient markets with the 
addition of features such as ‘imperfect information’ and ‘investor preferences’. These 
additions amount to underlying inefficiencies. For these theorists, Quantitative Easing 
works through these underlying inefficiencies to enable other markets to operate as they 
should (Kiyotaki & Moore, 2012). Basically, by lowering the cost of credit instruments - 
whether they be mortgages or corporate bonds - QE enables access to credit in an 
environment where, due to the financial crisis, such markets had been shut off. In an 
ideal world, this would allow other markets to operate efficiently, leading to wider 
investment, wealth and income. Of course, such an outcome is not given. There may be 
inefficiencies upon inefficiencies upon externalities which inhibit this path of events. 
But this kind of approach is essentially an attempt to compensate for the deficiencies of 
the underlying ontology, with the continuous addition of caveats to explain why the 
counterfactual - efficient markets - does not exist. 
Abandoning the ontology of efficient markets opens the scope for a different approach 
to studying QE. Firstly, this thesis will adopt a Minsky-Keynes framework in order to 
understand economic and more specifically, portfolio decision making in conditions of 
uncertainty. Studying the link between QE, portfolio decisions and investment will 
allow for a better understanding of the programme’s effects. However, the insights 
offered by Minsky and Keynes must be supplemented with an understanding of how the 
current systemic imperatives of finance, also exert influence upon portfolio decisions 
(Lawson, 1994). Therefore, by placing the portfolio decisions of agents in a systemic 
context, an alternative interpretation of Quantitative Easing - and more specifically its 
impact upon households  - will be developed. 
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Chapter one of this thesis will proceed to explain the Minsky-Keynes approach to 
portfolio decision making. This approach highlights the various factors which inform 
portfolio decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. It also shows that investment in 
the capitalist economy is the result of specific alignments that occur between the 
portfolio decisions of different actors. With this in mind, the second chapter of this 
thesis will seek to establish empirically the impact of Quantitative Easing on low to 
middle income households. It will begin by demonstrating that the most direct impact of 
the QE programme upon households was dependent upon their level of exposure to 
financial assets. The lack of access low to middle income households have to such 
assets meant that this group experienced less benefits from the programme than their 
high income counterparts. However, QE has also played a role in  restoring the 
Mortgage Backed Security market and thereby establishing favourable financing 
conditions for households. Such favourable financing conditions can, in theory, lead to 
increased investment in real estate and rising house prices. As low to middle income 
households have a high degree of exposure to real estate, this group had a higher chance 
of benefitting from this process. Nevertheless, it will be shown that the recovery in 
property prices has disproportionately favoured high income household wealth. 
Chapter Three attempts to account for the inequitable distribution of wealth benefits 
accruing from the housing recovery. It will do so by exploring how QE supported 
portfolio decision making that, in turn, worked to restore two important aspects of the 
financial system: the schema of competitive calculation and wholesale funding markets. 
The first of these refers to the process by which finance determines asset prices, while 
the second is at the heart of credit distribution within financial markets. Both of these 
operations require collateral to function. Quantitative Easing, in partnership with other 
government programmes, worked to support finance’s capacity to create collateral from 
household liabilities. However, it will be shown that the portfolio decisions of financial 
agents taken in response, failed to result in eased financing conditions for low to middle 
income households. This is because these households had a limited capacity to support 
the creation of collateral assets, due to the weakness of their balance sheets. Such 
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restricted financing can account for the lack of investment in the real estate market 
which has resulted in depressed low to middle income household wealth. 
The last Chapter of this thesis will then assess the implications of QE’s impact on low to 
middle income households for the wider recovery of American capitalism. It will argue 
that in the years since the crisis, restoring households’ capacity to provide collateral has 
come at the expense of facilitating the capacity of this group to consume out of 
increases in wealth. The result has been a demand gap leading to weak levels of 
investment in the early recovery. The chapter will end by speculating on how the 
tension between households’ dual role may be resolved in the immediate future, arguing 
that the changing imperatives of the financial system may lead to a resumption of the 
debt-led consumption regime. This argument will therefore align with the general 
contention of this thesis: that Quantitative Easing has instigated a recovery that includes 
low to middle income households only in so far as this group have the capacity to 
support finance.  
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Chapter One 
The Minksy-Keynes Asset Pricing and Portfolio Theory: A 
Conceptual Framework for Exploring Quantitative Easing 
Quantitative Easing’s effect can be understood as a product of the portfolio decisions 
that it helped to facilitate. These portfolio decisions have led to investment paths which 
have disproportionately favoured high income households over their low to middle 
income counterparts. To give such an investigation conceptual grounding is the purpose 
of this chapter. It will therefore begin by outlining the Minsky-Keynes asset pricing 
theory. The total rate of return equation developed in this analysis will be applied to 
explain which factors go towards determining the expected rate of return accruing to 
different types of assets. From here, the chapter will detail how the portfolio decisions 
of agents interact to influence investment. This points toward the key contention of this 
chapter: that some kind of positive alignment of expectations between firms or 
households and finance is necessary to bring forth the portfolio decisions which induce 
high rates of investment. After this argument is detailed in full, a conceptual framework 
will be in place that can be utilised to understand how households were impacted by the 
QE programme. For, placing the portfolio decisions of agents in a systemic context will 
facilitate an understanding of the paths of investment that led to QE’s effect upon this 
group. 
1.1 The Rate of Return Equation 
Capital and financial assets  are expected to produce a yield over a period of time. This 
is an explicit yield; the cash flow that accrues as the asset is used in production or as the 
issuer makes payments to the asset holder. In such a context,  Keynes stated that it was 
puzzling why non or low yield bearing assets, such as money, are valued as a store of 
wealth (Keynes, 1937: 216). However, he recognised that these assets yield a return as 
protection against contingencies in a world of uncertainty (Wells, 1983: 524). The yields 
which attach to other assets are liable to revision, and in such an environment liquid 
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assets offer a store of wealth which is relatively certain (Minsky, 2008a: 71; Minsky, 
2008b: 87). This then, is an implicit yield, representative of  the amount of explicit 
return a holder is willing to sacrifice for liquidity services. We shall name the explicit 
yield y and the implicit yield l respectively.  In addition to this, the return of an asset 
will be affected by its expected appreciation over a period of time, a, and its carrying 
costs, c.  Keynes used the term  ‘carrying costs’ to refer to an asset’s ‘wastage… 1
through the passage of time’ and its warehousing costs (1936: 225). Minsky, 
meanwhile, used the term with reference to the financing costs associated with holding 
an asset (2008a: 82-83). 
Given these elements, we can create an equation describing  the elements which go 
towards establishing the expected net rate of return for an asset.  It should be noted that 2
this rate is a proportion of the existing price. If the rate of any asset is high, then 
increased interest in that asset is likely to drive up its price until the proportions are 
similar across all asset classes, creating a stock equilibrium.  3
      
 R = y + l - c +a  
At this point, Keynes sought to combine this theory with his notion of liquidity 
preference to account for investment in capital assets. Keynes stated that each capital 
asset has its ‘own’ rate of interest stated in terms of money. Investment would proceed 
only if the ‘own rates’ of assets available were above that of money (Keynes, 1936: 
222-225). As Wray and Tymoigne note, this schema has the implicit assumption that 
financing for such investment is always accessible (2008: 7). Minsky’s great innovation 
 Both of these figures are expressed as a proportion of the asset’s current value1
 The equation has been summarised and expressed in its above form by (Wray & Tymoigne, 2
2008).
 Equilibrium in this context has no link to the neoclassical definition. Rather, it represents a 3
situation where no agent has an incentive to change their behaviour in regards to shifting their 
interest out of one asset class into another (Wray & Tymoigne, 2008: 7) . This is because the 
expected rate of return as a proportion of the price will be the same across all asset classes. Of 
course, changing expectations regarding factors in the equation will induce such changes, 
shifting the equilibrium as a consequence. 
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was to analyse how the dynamics of finance feed into and influence the decision to 
invest in capital assets (Wray & Tymoigne, 2008). This innovation will be elaborated 
upon later in the chapter. But first, it is necessary to consider how this framework is 
divorced from the orthodoxy. 
1.2 Divorced from the Orthodoxy: The Total Rate of Return Equation and 
Prices 
The above schema will apply differentially, depending on the situation and judgment of 
each agent in the economy. It is therefore necessary to make clear how this rate of return 
equation relates to prices as they appear in markets. This will make explicit the divorce 
between the Minksy-Keynes approach to asset pricing and the orthodoxy. For, it seems 
that the total rate of return equation outlined could be integrated into an orthodox 
understanding of the price mechanism within efficient markets. This is because the 
factors within the equation (q, c, l and a ) could all reflect the determination of agents 
being guided by fundamentals (Wray & Tymoigne, 2008: 14). This rational judgment 
could then be reflected within prices. Furthermore, within this framework we can 
integrate the notion of potential derivations from expected returns through pricing 
volatility. Thus, to divorce this schema from orthodox theory, we must introduce an 
ontology defined by uncertainty. In such a context, even anticipated risk or volatility is 
subjective and therefore open to revision. Due to the presence of uncertainty, Minksy 
and Keynes both emphasised that prices within financial markets were established by 
convention. The implications of this have been well expressed by Wray and Tymoigne: 
  
 In order to reduce ignorance about an unknowable future, fundamentals are 
 created through social interactions in order to provide a vision of the future that 
 justifies current decisions. (Wray & Tymoigne, 2008: 15)  4
 It is interesting to note the similarity of this ‘convention’ view point to the recent literature on 4
performativity. See, in particular (Esposito, 2013).
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This does not necessarily mean that every agent operates with the same defined 
expectations when it comes to the factors embodied in the equation. Rather, financial 
markets function to synthesise all these individual judgements into prices that agents 
then have reference to. Agents may accept the truth of these prices, and therefore the 
judgments embodied within them (as they tend to do in crisis or in boom conditions) or 
challenge them through undertaking contrasting strategies.  For example, let us say that 5
the price of a relatively illiquid bond is low. An agent could accept that the expected rate 
of return is embodied in that price. Alternatively, they could expect the explicit yield to 
be a very high proportion of that price. If this agent has little willingness to sacrifice 
explicit yield for liquidity, they may then purchase the asset. If enough agents make the 
same decision, then the price of the asset will change.  The key point here, is that there 
is nothing pre-determined or technical about this determination. Prices will be a product 
of agents’ own subjective judgements regarding the factors embodied in the equation as 
they seek to manage their wealth in a context of uncertainty.  6
1.3 The Rate of Return Accruing to Capital Assets and Real Estate 
The next section proceeds on the basis that there are particularities involved in the rate 
of return accruing to financial, capital and real estate assets that must be highlighted. 
Through this analysis, elements of the relationship between the expected rate of return 
accruing to capital assets, housing and the decisions of financial agents will necessarily 
be highlighted. Let us begin by presuming that we are operating with a given value 
placed on the insurance provided by liquidity.  With this assumption in place, the main 7
 This does not mean that agents purely have reference to third party judgment, as in Keynes’ 5
‘beauty contest’ (Keynes, 1936: 156-157). Rather, prices can be reflective of integral 
judgements agents have made as to the profitability of a project. Financial markets are complex, 
and prices reflect outcomes of contrasting subjective judgements that agents have acted upon for 
a variety of reasons.
 The mechanisms through which finance mediates the expectations of individual agents 6
to form asset prices will be considered in Chapter Three. 
 Agents will value liquidity differently according to the context in which they operate. 7
Confidence will see the value of implicit yield become negligible, while in crisis conditions it 
becomes the dominating factor.
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factor behind the decision to purchase capital assets (those used within the production 
process), by a non-financial firm is the explicit yield that the asset in question offers 
(Keynes, 1936: 226).  The reason behind this can be accounted for by considering how 8
the other figures in the above equation apply to the pricing of capital assets. Firstly, over 
the course of its life a capital asset depreciates, meaning that a will be negative and 
predictable. Secondly, once purchased, a capital asset is not particularly marketable 
when compared to say, a financial asset.  The market for the asset in question may be 9
narrow and furthermore, its marketability will decline as depreciation begins. This 
means that l will be negligible. Therefore, the main relationship that must be analysed 
when it comes to purchasing capital assets, is that between the expected explicit yield 
(y) and carrying costs (c). Minsky, puts particular emphasis on the component of c 
which comes from the cost of financing a capital good (2008a: 82-83). This cost will 
obviously depend on the situation of a firm. If operating from existing cash balances, 
the financing cost represents that which is associated with parting with money as a form 
of insurance. Thus, in such a circumstance, a judgment to invest will be made solely on 
the basis of the expected explicit yield when compared to the implicit liquidity return (l) 
attaching to money (2008a: 85-86). However, if  debt financing is needed to expand a 
firm’s portfolio into capital assets then the price of credit will be an issue of concern. As 
Minksy puts it: “A decision to invest is a decision to emit liabilities or decrease 
liquidity” (Minsky, 2008a: 86). Thus, the the decision of financial agents in distributing 
credit liabilities must be considered in order to understand the expected rate of return 
accruing to a capital asset. 
Behind all portfolios is a balance sheet, in which agents take on liabilities in order to 
fund the acquisition of assets. In this sense, a balance sheet represents expected relative 
cash outflows and inflows set over a period of time (Minsky, 2008a: 85). A firm will be 
 This is obviously an abstraction, as non-financial firms have portfolios made up of financial 8
and capital assets (Minsky, 2008a: 85-86). However, the differentiation is made on the basis that 
it is only these firms that  usually take direct ownership of capital assets.
 Liquidity or marketability is obviously more relevant to those who may be involved in 9
creating investment goods for purchase or ownership by others
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reliant on income from the assets it holds in order to meet the liabilities it owes, 
particularly to financial agents. Every time a firm borrows to invest in a capital asset, it 
will have to engage with the liability side of its balance sheet and therefore the terms of 
credit (c) offered by finance. It is this comparison between the terms offered by finance 
(c) and the explicit yield (y) (net of depreciation) that informs the total rate of return 
accruing to an asset. However, finance’s influence extended beyond the determination 
of c. For, Minsky envisaged that finance played a role in determining the total rate of 
return in a positive sense, through its influence on a firms’ share price. Minsky makes 
clear that in making the decision to purchase a capital asset, firms will also have 
reference to how such an action may increase this value, for the benefit of shareholders 
(2008a: 87).  If the value is expected to increase, then this will encourage the firm in 
question to take ownership of the asset in question. Thus, it is clear that finance has 
influence over the expected rate of return accruing to a capital asset, both in terms of its 
influence on the share price of firms and c.   
In comparison, the two main factors informing the rate of return for housing will be the 
expected appreciation of the asset, (a), and financing terms, (c), on which it is available. 
In addition, real estate also carries an explicit yield, which represents savings in rent 
costs. Given this yield, finance sets the terms of credit that households then compare 
with expected appreciation to establish the anticipated rate of return for the asset. 
However, the role of the implicit yield in this process is complex. For, households’ 
willingness to buy and sell real estate may lie exterior from the value placed on 
liquidity. This will be important to keep in mind when this thesis discusses low to 
middle income household portfolio choices in chapter two.  
1.4 The Rate of Return Accruing to Financial Assets 
Financial assets are more flexible than capital and real estate assets. As well as offering 
an explicit yield, financial assets can also be relatively liquid and appreciate over time. 
However, financial assets are not homogenous. For example, a treasury bond is a highly 
liquid asset with a clear, definable yield. A share, meanwhile, may be less liquid, with 
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an uncertain yield, but will probably appreciate more over a defined time period. Both 
of course, are financial assets. A financial portfolio then, will be constructed according 
to an agent’s preferences surrounding the extent to which they prioritise - relatively 
speaking - the different constituent elements of the total rate of return equation.  10
Understanding this will become particularly important when this thesis comes to 
consider the nature of collateral assets in chapter three. 
1.5 Financial Firms, Non-Financial Firms, Households and Investment 
In this framework, a shift in the stock equilibrium of portfolio assets results in flows of 
investment. In simpler terms, the changing portfolio decisions of agents will affect how 
funds flow to different investment projects (Minsky, 2008a: 31, 134). The task of this 
chapter is to consider how these portfolio decisions interact to determine both capital 
and real estate investment. This is important to understand. For, investment patterns in 
capital assets and the real estate market have been key to establishing the effect of QE 
on low to middle income households. 
Let us begin, by exploring capital investment. When making the decision to invest in 
capital assets, firms have reference to the supply price, which is the price of labour and 
production inputs. This represents the total cost of the asset. They then compare this to a 
demand price which reflects the expected return embodied in an asset given a value for 
the insurance offered by money (Minsky, 2008a: 91-98).  Only if the demand price is 
above the prevailing supply price will investment proceed. We already have the 
elements in place to decipher how finance relates to the establishment of the demand 
price. Firstly, Minsky envisages the demand price as being reflected within financial 
markets (Minsky, 2008a: 99). One must be careful to understand what this implies. 
Indeed, it should not be taken to mean that there is an automatic abrogation of firms’ 
agency regarding the prospective profitability of a project to financial agents. Minsky 
 The term financial portfolio may be misleading because, as Minsky highlights, all 10
portfolios are essentially financial in the sense that they embody assets which are 
expected to result in some type of yield denominated in money (Minsky, 2008a: 68-71). 
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makes clear that a firm’s role is to make decisions for themselves that will induce an 
increase in its share price due to the expected explicit yield a capital asset is expected to 
offer (Minsky, 2008a: 86).We can posit here the existence of a reflexive relationship 
between such judgments and financial evaluation. Firms’ decisions will inform financial 
evaluation, but such financial evaluation can then impact on the demand price of firms. 
This is because increasing their own share price is of increasing priority for firms, as it 
satisfies shareholders. If they believe that an increase in share price is likely following 
investment in an asset, then this may improve the demand price at which they are 
willing to purchase it. Thus, there is a reflexive relationship between the judgment of 
firms and finance which establishes the demand price. 
The cost of credit - determined by financial agents - is also likely to be a telling factor in 
establishing the demand price. This is referred to by Minsky as ‘lenders’ risk’ (2008a: 
111). A financial agent will judge the expected rate of return that will accrue from 
holding a firm’s liability according to the likelihood that the firm will be able to service 
the instrument in question. Thus, if financial agents do not perceive the project to be 
profitable, then the price of credit may either be high, or supply withdrawn 
completely.  Either way, the demand price will increase, potentially beyond the supply 11
price the firm has reference to. However, if the financial agent believes that the project 
is likely to be profitable, then credit may well be distributed at a favourable rate. It is 
clear then, that the alignment of expectations between finance and firms - surrounding 
the profitability of a project - creates the conditions necessary for the perpetuation of 
investment in capital assets. If the agents’ views misalign with each other, then this may 
be enough to inhibit capital investment by pushing the demand price beyond that of the 
supply.  
One last point should be made here. Financial agents, like their non-financial 
counterparts, also place value on the insurance offered by money. If this value increases 
- as it tends to do in times of crisis - then this could inhibit their willingness to lend to 
 There may be circumstances where the strength of the firm’s balance sheet convinces finance 11
to distribute liabilities to it on the basis that even if the project fails, the firm will be able to 
service the liability. 
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firms. However, as will be shown in Chapters Two and Four, one of the main 
achievements of Quantitative Easing has been to ensure that demand for liquidity on the 
part of financial institutions has been satisfied. This provides further evidence to support 
the notion that depressed investment since the crisis has more to do with these agents’ 
assessment of the prospective profitability of investment rather than an increased 
liquidity preference. Indeed, while finance must be ready and willing to distribute credit 
at favourable rates - especially coming out of crisis -  this is never enough for 
investment to occur (Keynes, 1936: 158). A firm must also be willing to make the 
associated portfolio decision to purchase the capital asset on the basis of the returns it is 
expected to offer.  
Despite the above analysis, the path towards investment does not necessarily have to 
derive from the portfolio decisions of agents who share the same expectation. Things 
get more complicated when we consider the influence of financial valuation on 
investment as it occurs within the real estate market. Here, investment can be defined as 
the allocation of funds to the purchase of residential property. In this setting, the 
expected rate of return accruing to financial assets can become influenced by other 
factors separate to the performance of the underlying asset in question. This is due to the 
development of securitisation practices (Wray & Tymoigne, 2008: 17-21). Securitisation 
refers to the process whereby financial institutions - instead of holding debt on their 
books - package it into another form and sell it to other agents (Lavoie, 2012: 12-14). In 
this context, the marketability of these instruments may be the primary factor informing 
a financial agent’s decision to extend the original liability to households and at what 
terms.  Furthermore, these processes actually feed back into the portfolio decisions of 
households, cheapening the cost of credit and driving expansive investment in housing. 
This increased investment has a reciprocal impact on the expected appreciation of real 
estate, supporting a cycle of asset price inflation and investment. 
The above analysis does not render nugatory the contention that there must be a positive 
alignment of expectations between agents for investment to occur. It does, however, 
mean that the necessary dimensions of such expectation alignment may encompass 
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different combinations of factors surrounding the assets involved. From the above 
explanation, it is clear that a household will invest in real estate primarily due to the 
expected appreciation of the asset, while finance may distribute the mortgage liability 
on the basis of its marketability. There is still an alignment of expectations here that has 
resulted in investment. But it is not an alignment around the same expectation. The 
household does not spend any time paying attention to the marketability of the security 
based upon its liability. Finance, meanwhile, does not have to pay as much attention to 
the expected appreciation of the asset nor the actual capacity of households to finance 
the loan, due to the fact that it can be sold easily. Nevertheless, positive expectations 
surrounding each factor have aligned to allow portfolio decisions which have facilitated 
investment. 
However, there is also vulnerability here.  For, the portfolio decisions which lead to 
investment are made regarding factors which are isolated from each other. This means 
that the different priorities of the agents involved could could come to compromise 
investment. For example, it will be shown in Chapter Three that changing expectations 
surrounding the marketability of mortgage-backed securities have shifted the portfolio 
decisions of finance in a way that has restricted access to credit for low to middle 
income households. As such, households have been unable to make the portfolio 
decisions necessary to facilitate investment in the real estate market and therefore 
enable asset price inflation in this sector. This will be shown to have important 
implications for low to middle income household wealth. 
So far, this section has established that some kind of alignment of expectations between 
finance and firms or households is necessary to bring forth portfolio decisions which 
lead to investment. However, this process of aligning expectations also sows the seeds 
for crisis. This is on the basis that positive expectations surrounding the rate of return 
accruing to assets feed unstable liability structures (Minsky, 2008b: 234). Minsky sought 
to demonstrate this with reference to non-financial firms. In a context of aligning 
expectations, finance becomes willing to facilitate wide access to credit. In addition, 
non-financial firms become leveraged as they take on liabilities based upon the 
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increasing expected rate of return accruing from the assets they take ownership of 
(Minsky, 2008b: 234). This leaves non-financial firms reliant on the phenomenon of 
increasing returns continuing into perpetuity. If this expectation is contravened, firms 
are left with liabilities they cannot meet. Importantly, this notion of unstable liability 
structures can easily be applied to other agents such as households. In Chapter Four, we 
will consider the implications and importance of leveraged household balance sheets in 
both the crisis and most recent recovery. 
This section has shown that investment is a product of portfolio decisions which result 
in the flow of funds towards different investment projects. Firstly, both finance and 
firms must expect a project to offer a satisfactory rate of return in order to draw forth 
the necessary portfolio decisions which allow capital investment to occur. However, the 
dynamics of financial valuation means that agents do not necessarily need to share the 
same expectation to configure a set of portfolio decisions that leads to investment. This 
became clear when considering the process of investment in the real estate market. 
Finally, it was shown that such positive expectation alignment can foster unstable 
liability structures. Thus, the process of investment in capitalism is inherently unstable 
and uncertain. Firstly, it relies on a particular configurations of aligning expectations 
always susceptible to revision. Secondly, when such expectations do align, unstable 
liability structures are eventually the result. This chapter will now end, by considering 
how profit derives from the investment processes described.  
1.6 Profitability and Investment 
Minsky, following on from Kalecki, believed that the investment of firms in the 
aggregate creates the conditions for their own profitability (1980: 516).  Let us say 12
agent A in sector one, decides to invest in creating consumption goods for households. A 
pays their factors of production and is left with a profit yet to be realised. For this to 
occur, there must be demand for the good in question. Consequently, B must invest, 
 This is on the assumption of a closed economy without a government sector. Minsky 12
envisaged a role for the state’s balance sheet in ensuring the profitability of firms. However, we 
can consider the dynamics of profitability without the state.
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enabling households with the income to purchase the goods that A has produced. 
Without the decision of B, A would be left without profit (Kalecki, 1971: 80-81). The 
key point here, is that no single firm or sector can invest its way towards profit.  
However, at this juncture it seems that it is only investment of non-financial firms that 
matters. There has been some confusion in interpreting Minsky on this basis. For, it has 
been claimed that this notion of profitability ignores the importance of consumption. 
More specifically, Ivanova claims that his theory is less useful in the current context, 
where debt fuelled household spending seems to be driving profitability, replacing 
wages and therefore investment (2012: 69-71). 
As such, now is an appropriate juncture to address this criticism and justify the use of 
Minsky in analysis of modern capitalism. Two things must be clarified here. Firstly, it is 
true that Minsky presumed that households’ capacity to consume derived from wages 
and therefore investment by firms (in a basic model). In present times, paths of 
investment have changed such that this consumption does not only derive from wages. 
But it is surely a step too far to divorce it from investment of all kinds. For, it must not 
be forgotten that the extension of credit to a household is a type of investment for the 
agent distributing the instrument. It seems then, that the Minsky-Kalecki notion of 
profitability is still clearly relevant. For, the spending of agents in one sector (finance) 
may clearly inhibit the profitability of others (non-financial firms) by restricting the 
distribution of liabilities necessary for households to consume. Indeed, this very path of 
events will be analysed and extended upon in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
Before we conclude this section it is necessary to clarify one issue left outstanding. 
Minsky adopted the Kaleckian assumption that workers spend what they earn (Kalecki, 
1971: 78-92; Minsky, 1980: 515). It is therefore necessary to introduce household 
agency into this model. This is particularly important in the context of this thesis. As 
will be shown in Chapter Four, before the crisis, households were increasingly 
consuming out of expected increases to the equity contained on their balance sheets. 
Consequent upon huge declines in net worth, households have attempted to repair their 
balance sheets by deleveraging, thereby foregoing consumption and rendering some 
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investment decisions unprofitable. It will therefore be demonstrated that the decisions 
households make with regards to consumption and their balance sheets, is also 
determinative of profitability.  
1.7 Conclusion 
This thesis will proceed on the basis that QE’s impact will be informed by the effect it 
has had upon portfolio decision making and therefore investment. It will seek to prove 
this by placing elements of the conceptual framework outlined here in a systemic 
context. Such a framework has at its heart the total rate of return equation that 
represents the factors which influence portfolio decisions. This chapter began by 
establishing how these factors apply differentially depending on the type of asset being 
considered. However, within that discussion, the clear relationship between the total rate 
of return expected to accrue to these assets and the decisions of financial agents was 
established. This chapter then proceeded to develop a theory of how interacting 
portfolio decisions are behind investment in capitalism. More specifically, it showed 
that a particular configuration of expectations must align for types of investment to 
occur. From here, it showed that the profitability of such investment derives from the 
aggregate spending decisions of all agents. This thesis will now continue by analysing 
how the portfolio decisions of different agents have interacted to produce investment 
outcomes which directly account for households’ experience of QE.  Before it does so, 
however, the empirical evidence surrounding QE’s impact on low to middle income 
household wealth must be be considered, in order to highlight the phenomena that are in 
need of explaining. 
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Chapter Two 
Quantitative Easing, Finance and Household Wealth: A Tale 
of Two Americas 
The aim of this chapter is to establish Quantitative Easing’s impact on low to middle 
income household wealth. This chapter’s focus on wealth - as distinct from income - can 
be justified on the basis that QE’s most direct impact was always going to be upon the 
value of assets rather than income flows. Quantitative Easing took place within financial 
markets and its most observable effects relate to financial asset prices. We need to trace 
the secondary effects to consider how the recovery in financial asset prices may have 
affected low to middle income households. Additionally, Quantitative Easing 
specifically targeted Mortgage Backed Securities, which eased financing conditions in 
the housing market. This may have worked to impact upon household wealth in two 
ways. Firstly, such conditions encourage investment in the real estate market which 
improves house prices and therefore household wealth. Alternatively, eased financing 
conditions instigated by QE may have worked to help households refinance their 
mortgage, increasing their wealth by reducing the burden of debt on the liability side of 
their balance sheets. Despite this, it will be shown that, at the very least, the benefits of 
recovery in the housing market have had an inequitable impact, favouring high income 
households. This will add validity to the central contention of this chapter; that the 
Quantitative Easing programme has disproportionately benefitted high income 
households. 
2.1 Saving Finance 
  
The aim of this section is to highlight the role of Quantitative Easing in ensuring a 
recovery in asset prices within financial markets.  We begin our story in November 2008 
when the Federal Reserve announced plans to purchase  $500 billion of government 
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sponsored Mortgage Backed Securities.  This was followed in March of the following 13
year with further purchases of Treasury securities and MBS (Fawley & Neely, 2013: 
60). The programme itself continued with purchases of a similar nature until October 
2014. The mechanics of this process involved mainly non-banks (those who do not hold 
deposits) who sold the aforementioned assets to the Federal Reserve (Carpenter, 
Demiralp, Ihrig, & Klee, 2015: 31).  The banks non-bank institutions deposited with 14
ended up with central-bank liabilities, resulting in an expansion of the monetary base 
(Keister & McAndrews, 2009: 6). 
The Minsky-Keynes asset pricing framework can be used to understand the impact of 
this intervention by the Federal Reserve. Firstly, however, we need to appreciate the 
context in which such an intervention took place. The crisis derived from the collapse of 
wholesale funding markets which were at the heart of credit distribution within the 
financial system (Gorton, 2010: 45-52). These markets functioned through repurchase 
agreements where collateral (a group of assets) would be held  in exchange for cash 
(Gorton, 2010: 44). As fears surrounding the quality of MBS began to develop, 
questions started to arise surrounding both the quality of the assets being used as 
collateral and the balance sheets of the agents who were seeking funding (Gorton, 2010: 
47-51). As a consequence, lenders in the repo market demanded a haircut: they offered 
less money for holding the asset than its stated value. This left financial institutions with 
a funding gap that was akin to a bank run, as the cash deposited through the repo market 
was suddenly withdrawn. In an effort to compensate, there was a fire sale of MBS as 
financial agents sought to both meet their funding commitments and remove the assets 
from their balance sheets (Gorton, 2010: 49-50). However, as a sufficient number of 
buyers could not be found for the assets investors wanted to pass off, their prices ended 
up collapsing (Mehrling, 2010: 130-131). This further compromised financial agents’ 
 This means securities sponsored by the government sponsored enterprises: Fannie Mae, 13
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae (U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2014: 10-13).
 It should be noted that the actual asset purchase the Federal Reserve partakes in, are done 14
with the primary dealers as counter parties. The task of the above study which is cited, is to 
discover the ultimate counter-parties to the transaction. In other words, who the primary dealers 
purchased securities from in order to sell them to the Federal Reserve. 
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willingness to lend to each other as the preference of agents for liquidity rose in the 
context of collapsing asset prices and declining marketability. 
Thus, the Federal Reserve was confronted with a two-dimensional liquidity problem, 
with the marketability of financial assets (l) declining just as the demand for liquidity 
increased. To solve this issue, the Fed acted as a market maker of last resort, ensuring 
the general marketability of MBS (Mehrling, 2010: 132-135). Importantly, this allowed 
financial agents to dispense with the instruments whose declining value had been 
responsible for the liquidity issues described above. Furthermore, the central bank 
liabilities distributed to non-depository institutions ended up with depository banks, as 
highlighted above. This then helped meet the increased demand for liquidity by agents 
in the financial system, encouraging them to seek yield-bearing assets.  There has been 15
particular scholarly interest in recent years surrounding which yield-bearing assets have 
been of interest to agents following the QE programme. Some have claimed that QE’s 
focus on the purchase of long-term assets encouraged agents to seek long dated 
instruments, on the basis of their preference for maturity balance in their portfolios 
(Gagnon, Raskin, Remache & Sack, 2011: 6-10; Joyce, Miles, Scott & Vayanos, 2012: 
279-281). Whatever the case, it is clear that declining corporate-bond yields has been a 
prevalent feature of the programme’s impact, decreasing the financing costs for firms 
with access to this market (Joyce et al, 2012: 279-281). However, these lower yields 
have not necessarily been used to undertake expansive capital investment. Rather, the 
investment has been internalised to financial markets. Commenting on the period 
2009-2014, Rixtel and Villegas state that: 
 …when debt financing costs are favourable and equity markets are rallying, US 
 non-financial corporations issue bonds heavily and use some of the proceeds to 
 finance stock  repurchases. During 2009-14, the average quarterly amount of 
 net bond issuance was almost twice that during the previous boom. US non-
 financial corporations repurchased  $2.1 trillion in shares and raised $1.8 
 This should have lead to an increased willingness on the part of banks to lend to small 15
businesses directly or to the smaller financial institutions which more actively do so. Why such 
a process may not have occurred will be considered in Chapter Four.
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 trillion in net bond financing in this period, compared to $1.3 trillion and $850 
 billion, respectively, during 2002-07 (Rixtel & Villegas, 2015). 
In other words, cheapening credit costs have been used to further stoke increases in 
share prices. This is evidence that firms are actively pursuing strategies which are 
increasing the valuation of their companies within the stock market. This in itself is not 
surprising, as the last chapter showed that such a goal is an imperative of firms. 
However, it seems that in the years since the crisis, firms have not attempted to create 
this outcome through stocking their portfolios with capital assets which have expected 
high rates of return. Instead, large firms are actively increasing the price of their own 
shares by utilising cheap credit to participate in buy-back schemes. The results are 
reflected in Figure One. 
Figure One: The S&P 500 (2007-2015) 
!  
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indicies LLC, 2015. 
2.2 Recovery in Financial Markets and Low to Middle Income Households 
It is time to consider the wider effects of the programme upon low to middle income 
households. This thesis defines low to middle income households as those within the 
0-60 percentiles of income distribution as determined by the Federal Reserve’s Survey 
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of Consumer Finances.  The median income for those in the 0-19.9 quintile was $13 16
800 as of 2013. For households located in the 20-39.9 range, the figure sat at $28 400, 
while for those in the 40-59.9 quintile it was $46 700 (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 7).  17
The overall median income for all households in the United States was also $46 700 
(The Federal Reserve, 2014: 4).  To study the effect of the programme upon these 18
households it is necessary to isolate whether this group had any opportunity to directly 
benefit from increasing financial asset prices. In order to determine this, household 
exposure to financial assets within the United States must be considered. Figure Two 
seems, at first glance, to indicate a widespread access to financial assets. 
Figure Two: Percentage of Households With Direct and Indirect Stock Holdings 
Stock Holdings  19
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) Chartbook 2014, p. 511. 
Income 
Percentile
Year 0-19.9 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
2010 12.5 30.5 51.7 68.1 82.6 90.6
2013 11.4 26.4 49.7 69.5 81.6 93
 The term used in the survey is families, rather than households. Ostensibly, there is little 16
relevant difference for the purpose of this thesis. The survey operates through the identification 
of a PEU (primary economic unit) which is intended to be the economically dominant single 
person or couple and all other persons who are financially interdependent on that unit. The 
‘family’ therefore, represents a particular configuration of a household. 
 All are values presented in 2013 US dollars.17
 It should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the figures relevant to the income 18
quintiles published in the SCF Chartbook (2014), and in the summary written by Bricker et al 
(2014). However, the trends identified are the same. Bricker et al, write that: 
 “…all but the highest income quintile saw declines in median income between 2010 
 and 2013” (Bricker et al, 2014: 6). 
This same trend is revealed by the Chartbook, albeit with different figures (The Federal 
Reserve, 2014: 7). The nationwide median figure is the same in both the Chartbook and the 
Summary.
 Households may indirectly own stock through participation in a pension fund or directly, by 19
holding such assets themselves
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While the lowest quintile has some access to financial assets, the next two quintiles 
seem to have relatively high degrees of exposure. However, ownership of financial 
assets does not equate to ownership of an extensive portfolio. When looking closely at 
the mean value of such stock holdings we see in fact, quite low numbers for the first 
three quintiles ($71 000; $51 000; and $63 000 respectively).  In comparison, the stock 20
holdings of the highest income households (those in the top decile) have a mean value 
of $975 000. Just one decile down, the mean value of such holdings drops to $199 000 
(The Federal Reserve, 2014: 511-513). This is indicative of the inequitable distribution 
of financial assets between the income quintiles, which disproportionately favours those 
at the very top of income distribution. According to Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal 
Reserve, the bottom half of families grouped by income collectively own 8 per cent of 
all financial assets held by American households (Yellen, 2014). The implications of this 
inequitable distribution have been recognised by the Federal Reserve in its summary of 
the 2010-2013 Survey of Consumer Finances:  
Consistent with income trends and differential holdings of housing and 
corporate equities, families at the bottom of the income distribution saw 
continued substantial declines in real net worth between 2010 and 2013, while 
those in the top half saw, on average, modest gains (Bricker et al., 2014a: 2). 
Here, Bricker, et al, are making an important point: differential holdings of assets 
between households have shaped their experience of the recovery. As high income 
households have disproportionately greater ownership of financial assets, Quantitative 
Easing was always going to be more beneficial for this group. Such analysis aligns with 
the existing literature which coalesces around the notion that while Quantitative Easing 
promotes recovery within the financial sphere, it generally has inequitable distributional 
effects. This is because only high income households benefit from the capital gains and 
 All values are presented as 2013 American dollars20
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increased returns that result from recovering financial asset prices (Saiki & Frost, 2014: 
2; The Bank of England, 2012). 
2.3 The Housing Market Recovery and Low to Middle Income Households 
QE’s ability to lower MBS yields should have had reciprocal benefits for financing 
conditions in the housing market. The Federal Reserve was able to lower these yields 
through two pathways. Firstly, it acted as a source of demand for MBS, increasing the 
price of these assets. Secondly, by ensuring MBS’ marketability, QE encouraged active 
trading in the instrument on the basis of the assets’ restored liquidity (Hancock & 
Passmore, 2011: 498-499). Lower yields were then translated into favourable financing 
rates on the basis that an overwhelming majority of originations following the crisis 
were securitised by a government sponsored enterprise (Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, 2014: 8; Hancock & Passmore, 2011: 501).  Consequently, most mortgage 21
rates in the post-crisis period constituted a ‘mark-up’ on government sponsored MBS 
(Hancock & Passmore, 2011: 509). Thus, by lowering the starting point on which that 
mark-up was made, declining MBS yields were able to have a positive impact on 
financing conditions. The importance of such financing conditions for instigating a 
recovery in house prices - especially in a depressed market - can be appreciated by 
applying the Minsky-Keynes Asset pricing framework.  
As was stated in the last chapter, a primary residence offers  an explicit rental yield. 
Arguably, however, the two main factors informing the expected rate of return for such 
an asset will be the perceived future appreciation (a) of the asset and the financing terms 
(c) on which it is available. On consideration of these factors, the rate of return as a 
proportion of the price of the property will be determined, informing the ultimate 
purchase decision.  In the aftermath of crisis, with expected appreciation low, 
favourable financing conditions are needed to induce investment in housing. If 
households are cut off from financing or the terms place c above a then households will 
 As of 2014 80 per cent of newly originated mortgages were still backed by a government 21
enterprise (Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2014: 8)
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not make the portfolio choice to either sell or buy property. This means that investment 
in the real estate market will remain depressed. Here, we can adjust and apply the 
Kaleckian notion of profitability to appreciate the outcome. Without sufficient aggregate 
spending by households in the real estate market, house prices will not appreciate and 
the wealth recovery will remain stagnant. 
In addition, low financing costs are important for wealth recovery because they may 
draw households into refinancing decisions. This can lower the burden of households’ 
liabilities and therefore positively impact their balance sheets. However, there is a limit 
to the extent that refinancing can improve household balance sheets. Firstly, in the 
current context, homeowners who do not have a loan backed by a government 
sponsored enterprise cannot access the refinancing programmes that have been put in 
place (Hancock & Passmore, 2011: 502).  Secondly, reducing interest payments may 22
stop the deterioration of a household balance sheet, but it cannot singularly lead to its 
recovery. Thus, the key to QE’s potential impact upon low to middle income household 
wealth, lies within within the possibility of improving house prices instigated by eased 
financing conditions. That such an event could have implicated low to middle income 
households is shown by the percentage of this group that own their primary residence. 
Figure Three: Primary Residence Ownership (%) 
Source: SCF Chartbook 2014, p. 582. 
Income Percentile
Year 0-20 20-39.9 40-59.9 
2007 41.4 55.2 69.3
2010 37.2 55.9 71
2013 37 53.8 63
 The programme referred to is the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). This 22
allowed households who had a GSE mortgage to reduce their interest rate payments, even if 
they had almost no equity on their balance sheet (Fannie Mae, 2015b).
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However, the favourable financing conditions seen within the mortgage market do not 
seem to have resulted in rising asset prices for low to middle income households. 
Indeed, Figure Four shows that median house prices declined for low to middle income 
households in the period 2010-2013. 
Figure Four: Median Value of Primary Residences (Thousands of 2013 Dollars)  23
Source: SCF Chartbook 2014, p. 583. 
This has driven a decline in the wealth of low to middle income households. From 2010 
to 2013, median net worth declined by 7.6 per cent, 18.2 per cent and 12.6 per cent for 
the bottom three income quintiles respectively (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 43).  There 24
are, however, complications associated with relying on these results. From 2012 
onwards, the housing prices have improved in the United States, as shown by Figure 
Five. In its summary of the survey, the Federal Reserve notes this complication, 
implying that the results my not be reflective of the actual experience of households 
Income 
Percentile
Year 0-20 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
2010 95.4 117.9 144.7 187.5 267.9 509.1
2013 80 105.9 125.0 170.0 250.0 475.0
% Change -16.1 -10.2 -13.6 -9.3 -6.7 -6.7
 For purposes of clarification, this is a measurement of the median house price of those in the 23
relevant quintile, who own their primary residence.
 The same discrepancy mentioned in footnote 17, is evident again here. However, the trends 24
identified in  these sources are the same. Both the Summary and the Chartbook reveal net worth 
declines for the bottom three income quintiles, with only the fourth quintile making substantial 
gains (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 43; Bricker et a., 2014: 8-9).
!32
(Bricker et al, 2014: 19).  Ultimately, the extent to which these households have been 25
positively included in the recovery in housing markets will not be fully known until the 
survey is updated in 2016. In the interim, there has been a contention posed in both the 
popular and academic literature, that the housing recovery has been inequitable, 
disproportionately favouring high income households (Emmons & Noeth, 2013a, 
2013b; Gerrity, 2015; Hughes-Cromwick, 2013; Light, 2015). 
Figure Five: All Transactions House Price Index   26
!  
Source: US Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), 2015a.  
Empirical support for such a contention can be given by comparing how different states 
have experienced the recent recovery. This methodology has been used in particular by 
 In its summary of the survey, the Federal Reserve seeks to explain away the decline in house 25
prices experienced by households from 2010-2013: 
 In addition, the divergence in house price trends is well within empirical estimates of 
 homeowner reporting bias in house values, and it may reflect a correction in perceived 
 values following the housing boom period, during which houses may have been  
 overvalued by respondents. It is also worth noting that since the 2013 survey was 
 administered, house price indexes have increased substantially (Bricker et al, 2014:19). 
However, these results - particularly in the lower income quintiles - may be more reflective of 
the inequitable nature of house price recovery, rather than the bias of survey respondents. 
 This measure includes newly purchased houses and those that have been refinanced. It has 26
been chosen primarily because it is an equally weighted index. This means that the measure 
itself seeks to capture the trend in house prices across the board (Noeth & Sengupta, 2011a).
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Emmons and Noeth in an article written for the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (2013a). 
These scholars begin by identifying representative high price and low price states. This 
categorisation refers to states which have a relatively large proportion of high value 
houses and low value houses respectively. This analysis will proceed by adopting the 
chosen high price representative states of Emmons and Noeth, on the basis that these 
states are also populated by a relatively high proportion of high income households. As 
of 2013, the median household income in California was $61 094, while the recorded 
figure applicable to the District of Columbia is $65 830 (United States Census Bureau, 
2013).   As the median income in these states is significantly higher than nationwide - 27
as defined by the Survey and the Census - we can assume that higher income 
households are disproportionately represented in these states. The house price index in 
these states will be compared with those of Mississippi and West Virginia. According to 
data from the U.S Census,  the median household income for Mississippi as of 2013 was 
$31 031, while for West Virginia it was $41 300 (United States Census Bureau, 2013). 
In these states the median income is substantially lower than nationwide, meaning that 
we can assume that low to middle income households will be disproportionately 
represented in these states. 
Thus, comparing the house price indexes of these ‘low price’ and ‘high price’ states 
should help to establish whether the recovery within the housing market has been 
inequitable or not. We can see from the indexes below, that the ‘low price states’ began 
the crisis from a lower base, and the initial decline in prices within the housing market 
was not large. However, the recovery of prices in these states since 2012 pales in 
comparison to the experience of high price states. These states - beginning from a 
higher base - experienced a steep decline in house prices during the crisis. Since 2012, 
however, there has been a steep rise in the index applicable to the markets in these 
areas. This seems to support the aforementioned contention that the housing recovery 
 The U.S. Census measurement of household income uses a different methodology from that 27
of the Survey of Consumer Finances. However, as the summary of the survey states, the 
calculation of median household income has resulted in broadly commensurate outcomes for 
both surveys (Bricker et al, 2014: 31). This justifies the contention that the states mentioned are 
likely to be populated disproportionately by low to middle income households as defined by the 
survey.
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within the United States has been stratified, with most of the gains accruing to high 
income households. 
Figure Six: All Transactions House Price Index: California vs Mississippi 
!  
Source: US Federal Housing Financing Agency, 2015b & 2015c. 
Figure Seven: All Transactions House Price Index: Washington D.C. vs West Virginia 
!  
Source: US Federal Housing Financing Agency, 2015d & 2015e.
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2.4 Restricted Access to Financing and Weak Balance Sheets: Explaining the 
Stratified Recovery 
The rest of this thesis will attempt to account for and discuss the implications of 
Quantitative Easing’s impact on low to middle income household wealth. The last 
section of this chapter will establish the empirical basis on which such an investigation 
will proceed. Firstly, it will show the weakness of low to middle income household 
balance sheets in the aftermath of the crisis. Secondly, it will demonstrate that 
conditions in household financing since the crisis remain less than optimal for the same 
group. The next chapter will proceed to show how these two phenomena together, 
account for the inequitable impact of Quantitative Easing. 
Turning first to the weakness of household balance sheets. It can be seen from Figure 
Eight that low to middle income households carried disproportionately high debt 
burdens leading into the crisis (Foster, 2006). Through this particular measure - debt 
service payments to income - there is an inverse relationship between the extent of 
household leverage and income. While in 2007 26.9 per cent of households in the 
bottom quintile had a debt service income ratio of above 40 per cent, only 3.8 per cent 
of families in the top income decile suffered from the same problem (Bricker, 
Kennickell, Moore, & Sabelhaus, 2012: 72). 
Figure Eight: Percentage of Indebted Families Whose Debt Service Payments are 
Above 40 per cent of Family Income 
Source: Bricker et al 2012, p. 72. 
Income 
Quintile
Year 0-20 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
2001 29.3 16.6 12.3 6.5 3.5 2.0
2004 26.8 18.6 13.8 7.3 2.6 1.5
2007 26.9 19.5 14.5 12.9 8.2 3.8
2010 26.1 18.6 15.4 11.0 5.3 2.9
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In addition, this chapter has shown that low to middle income households have a high 
exposure to the real estate market through home ownership and a low exposure to 
financial assets. As a consequence, the wealth of this group is largely dependent on 
prices in the housing market. Therefore in 2007, household balance sheets were in a 
precarious position, but they were not necessarily weak. For, as long as house prices 
rose, so would net wealth. But the debt positions of households meant that their balance 
sheets were particularly susceptible to declining house prices. This can be demonstrated 
with an example. 
Let us say that a household has a mortgage of $60 000 on a property worth $100 000. 
This is the household’s sole asset. In addition, the household has consumer credit and an 
auto loan worth $10 000. This means that it has $30 000 worth of equity in the property 
itself, which represents its total net worth. Now, if the price of that property falls by 20 
per cent, then suddenly that household has lost around 66 per cent of the equity 
contained on its balance sheet. As such, changes in the price level of real estate for 
highly leveraged households can have a huge impact on their net worth. Thus, the 
decline in house prices seen after the crisis was always going to have a disproportionate 
impact on those with leveraged balance sheets. This is shown by the Survey of 
Consumer Finances which demonstrates that the bottom five quintiles - constituting 80 
per cent of  all households - experienced large declines in median net worth between 
2007-2010 (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 83).  These households were also those most 28
likely to be highly leveraged. In comparison, the top decile of American households - of 
whom only 3.8 per cent were highly leveraged - actually experienced an increase of 1.9 
per cent in their median net worth during the same period (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 
83). Thus, through a combination of reliance on house prices and leverage, the crisis 
pushed low to middle and the lower range of high income household balance sheets into 
a state of weakness. 
 Indeed, it should be noted that although leverage was concentrated in low to middle income 28
quintiles, households in the 60-80 percentiles - although not low to middle income - also 
experienced large declines in their net wealth from 2007-10.  
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One of the ways these balance sheets can be repaired is through increasing house prices 
and therefore recovery in net wealth. As was shown earlier in this thesis, such a 
recovery relies on eased financing conditions for households. However, access to the 
favourable financing conditions instigated by Quantitative Easing remains restricted for 
low to middle income households. On face value, this does not make much sense when 
considering that government agencies still guarantee around 80 per cent of new loans 
originated in the market by private actors (Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2014: 
8; Oliner, 2015).  One would therefore presume that these agencies would be in a 29
position to ensure wide accessibility to the market for low and middle income 
households. 
The first relevant agency which seems to offer particular support to low and middle 
incomes is the Federal Housing Agency (FHA). This organisation offers an insurance 
scheme that provides coverage for mortgages distributed to households which have a 
credit score of 580 and above (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
2015: 5) The agency which securitises FHA loans is Ginnie Mae. Importantly, however, 
to qualify for an FHA loan households have to pay a premium into an MMI fund which 
backs up all FHA insured loans (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
2015c) . The two other government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) which provide 
guarantees to the mortgage market are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Instead of insuring 
loans, these organisations purchase them to create Mortgage Backed Securities which 
are then sold to other agents.  The terms on which these agencies will buy such loans are 
stricter than those proposed by the FHA. Up until recently, the required deposit has been 
5 per cent with a credit score of 620 or higher (Fannie Mae, 2015c). Recently, however, 
these agencies reduced their deposit requirement to 3 per cent (Puzzanghera 2014). The 
financing trends applicable to FHA loans is shown in figure nine.  
 The 80 per cent figure derives from the 2014 FSOC report. The most recent report, released in 29
2015, stated that:  
 The GSEs remain in conservatorship, subject to FHFA supervision, with the vast  
 majority of newly originated mortgages carrying a federal government backing either 
 through the GSEs, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), or other government-
 backed programs.  
 (Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2015:16).
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Figure Nine: FHA Financing Trends (Average Credit Score Annually) 
Source: Ellie Mae Origination Insight Reports, 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
While eased financing conditions for FHA loans is evident, they still remain restricted 
for those at the bottom end of the eligibility range defined by credit score. Furthermore, 
this group is most likely to consist of low to middle income households (Perry, 2008: 
18; Hayashi & Stevens, 2012: 1,13; Edmonton, 2013: 50).  In 2014, the average credit 30
score for a closed FHA purchase loan was 684, while the average credit score for a 
denied FHA  purchase loan was 663. With regards to refinancing, the average successful 
score was 673, while the rejected average came to 635 (Ellie Mae, 2015: 8-9).  Seeing 
that up to 22 per cent of households have a credit score less than the average acceptance 
scores, it is clear that a relatively large section of households are potentially being 
locked out of the housing market (Dornhelm 2015). Meanwhile, 74 per cent of loans 
supported by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for a fixed rate 30 year mortgage for both 
purchase and refinancing purposes, were distributed to households who had a credit 
Purchase Credit Score Refinance Credit Score
2012 700 718
2013 695 698
2014 684 673
 Despite the above contention, it should be noted that the link between credit scores and 30
income has been empirically difficult to establish, as such a score does not have any particular 
reference to ‘income’ and relies rather, on the extent of debt obligations and the capacity of 
households to meet such obligations on time. Intuitively, however, it is possible to appreciate 
why low credit scores may tend to apply more prominently to low to middle income 
households. Firstly, this thesis has already established that such households have high debt-to-
income ratios which tend to result in low credit scores. Furthermore, scholars have worked to 
provide a direct correlation between the distribution of credit scores and size of income from the 
1990s onwards. Of particular note is the work done by Edmiston, who analyses the distribution 
of credit scores between high income per-capital counties and low income per-capita counties. 
She finds that “…individuals with the lowest credit scores tend to live in counties with the 
lowest per-capita incomes”. (Edmiston, 2013:50). Although Edmiston uses Equifax risk scores 
rather than FICO scores (those used above), the two are closely correlated (Hyashi & Stevens, 
2012: 3).  This analysis operates on the assumption that this historical trend is unlikely to have 
shifted. However, further research beyond the scope of this thesis is needed to clarify the scope 
of this correlation as it holds in the context of the modern recovery. 
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score above 720  in 2014 (U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2015f: 12-13).  This 31
is above the national average which sat at 694 in October 2014 (Dornhelm 2015). In 
comparison, just 22 per cent of loans guaranteed by these enterprises were distributed to 
those who scored 660-719.  The implications of this process have been summed up 
quite nicely by Reckard, writing in the Los Angeles Times. It is worth quoting the 
summation from the article in full:  
 The trends amount to a two-tiered mortgage market that heavily favours the 
 affluent over the masses of workaday borrowers, experts and advocates said. 
 “Older, wealthier, white borrowers will be able to get loans all day long,”…  
 For lower-income borrowers, lenders are “pulling up the gangplank,” 
(Reckard 2015). 
Such restricted financing conditions have worked to inhibit expansive investment in the 
real estate market - as shown in Figure Ten - and therefore dampen the possibility of 
improving house prices for low to middle income households. Given the dominant place 
real estate assets hold on the balance sheets of this group, the consequences have been a 
limited wealth recovery for low to middle income households. As such, accounting for 
the phenomenon of restrictive financing must be central to any explanation of 
Quantitative Easing’s impact. The next chapter of this thesis will argue that this trend 
can be explained by considering how Quantitative Easing - in partnership with the 
agencies highlighted above -  supported recovery in the mortgage market. Within this 
broader exploration it will become clear that the weak balance sheets of low to middle 
income households have in large part led to restrictive financing conditions for this 
group. 
 In 2012 the figure was 86 per cent and in 2013 it was 81 per cent. So while some kind of 31
easing is evident here as well, conditions still remain restrictive. 
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Figure Ten: Residential Investment: Quarters Since Recession Began to Q1 201432
!  
Source: Mian & Sufi 2014c. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has established that Quantitative Easing had an inequitable impact on the 
wealth of American households. Firstly, low to middle income households did not have 
exposure to the kind of financial assets that recovered their value in the wake of the QE 
programme. As a consequence, most of the benefits of the recovery in financial asset 
prices accrued to high income households. However, in targeting MBS, Quantitative 
Easing did, on the face of it, create favourable financing conditions on the mortgage 
market. Furthermore, it is clear that such eased financing conditions have played a role 
in the recovery of the U.S. housing market seen since 2012. However, once again, the 
benefits of increasing house prices seem to have been distributed inequitably. Thus, the 
available evidence supports the contention that, at the very least, the benefits of the 
Quantitative Easing programme have accrued disproportionately to higher income 
American households. This chapter has also established the empirical basis upon which 
 Although residential investment remains higher than in previous recoveries, it still lacks strength. This 32
is particularly problematic in the context of the current recovery, where high net-worth losses makes 
residential investment of increasing import. Without high levels of investment, a recovery in house prices 
becomes unlikely and household net worth remains depressed.
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the next chapter will proceed. Firstly, it showed that the crisis left low to middle income 
household balance sheets in a weak position. In addition, it demonstrated that financing 
conditions for this group remain largely restrictive, thereby compromising investment in 
the real estate market.  From here, this thesis will proceed to explain how these 
phenomena relate to each other by exploring QE’s support of mortgage markets since 
the crisis. In doing so, it will account for the existence of the two-tiered financing 
regime which has inhibited the investment necessary in real estate to expand low to 
middle income household wealth. 
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Chapter Three 
Households and Financial Collateral 
This chapter will show that low to middle income household wealth has benefited from 
Quantitative Easing, according to the extent that this group were able to support 
finance’s search for collateralisable assets. Such assets are critical to credit distribution 
and therefore the functioning of the financial system. After demonstrating collateral’s 
import in this respect, the chapter will move to analyse what defines a collateralisable 
asset from a perspective informed by the Minsky-Keynes asset pricing framework. It 
will be shown that collateralisable assets must be able to act as a safe store of value 
through time. This requires an alignment of expectations between market agents as to 
the marketability, appreciation and explicit yield of the asset in question. From this 
point, households’ role as providers of collateral before the crisis will be illustrated. 
Analysis will then focus on how QE and other U.S. governmental action, has ensured 
the collateral-like qualities of agency mortgage backed securities following the crisis. 
However, facilitating households’ capacity to provide the source material for these 
assets may have precluded low-to middle income households’ access to eased financing 
conditions. This is on the basis that collateralisable assets can no longer easily derive 
from the liabilities of households with weak or precarious balance sheets. 
3.1 The Role of Collateral in the Financial System 
This section will analyse how two elements of the financial system created an additional 
imperative for financial portfolio decision making external from the rate of return 
equation. The first element considered, will be wholesale funding markets. The second, 
will be the process of competitive calculation and asset price formation. It will be 
shown that for both elements of this system to function, finance must have the capacity 
to create a steady stream of collateral assets. Ultimately, this chapter will prove that  
Quantitative Easing’s support of the MBS market provided the basis upon which 
financial portfolio decisions were able to meet this imperative of collateral supply. 
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Before we reach this point however, we must first analyse the importance of collateral 
with reference to both wholesale funding markets and competitive calculation. 
Wholesale funding markets involve banking-like relations, with investors placing funds 
in short-term or liquid instruments and borrowers who use this short-term funding to 
finance holdings of longer-term, less liquid assets. However, these agents do not meet 
through the balance sheet of a depository institution, and instead are paired directly in 
the market through repurchase agreements (Gorton, 2010: 6-7). The tri-party repo 
market can be used to give a basic example. A tri-party repurchase agreement involves 
the two actors party to the transaction and a mediator (Rosengren, 2014). The first 
exchanging party is usually a Money Market Fund. These funds agree to supply a 
certain amount of cash to an investment bank or another institution. For example, the 
Money Market Fund may have $500 million it wishes to deposit. It agrees to distribute 
this money to the investment bank at an agreed rate of interest in return for collateral, 
which usually amounts to a designated section of the institution’s portfolio. The agreed 
transaction is then managed by an intermediator (International Capital Market 
Association, 2015). At the end of each day, this intermediator unwinds the transaction, 
passing the collateral back to the investor and cash to the lender. Often, however, the 
agreement is rolled over, meaning that the parties agree to the same transaction 
occurring again the next day. It is clear from this elucidation, that the key element in 
facilitating repo agreements is the presence of high quality collateral which can be 
exchanged for cash. 
Collateral is also the basis upon which the process of asset pricing occurs within 
financial markets. In order to understand this, the nature and importance of this process 
must be understood. According to Bryan and Rafferty, financial markets are the spatial 
setting in which individual, subjective judgements as to the expected return of an asset 
compete to form the price of the asset in question; a process that can be referred to as 
competitive calculation (2006: 74-76, 131). Thus, Bryan and Rafferty’s notion of the 
valuation or price formation process, aligns well with the conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter Two. For, these scholars demonstrate that it is the judgement of 
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financial actors, and their analysis of the factors embodied in the rate of return equation, 
that determine the formation of asset prices. As such, this process of competitive 
calculation is a key influence over portfolio decisions in the capitalist economy as a 
whole. This is because, as was shown in Chapter Two, a portfolio decision to purchase 
an asset is the culmination of a comparison between such asset prices and an agent’s 
own conception of the rate of return expressed as a proportion of that price. However, 
such a process of competitive calculation needs an anchor; assets which can be held as 
security against the uncertainties of this process. This is clearly understandable when 
operating from a Minskyan perspective. Agents - aware of the uncertainties surrounding 
asset yields and values - need a safe store of value for contingency purposes. Of course, 
for Minsky, this notion of the need for safe assets is generalised and explained with 
reference to uncertainty. In comparison, Bryan and Rafferty show its importance in 
facilitating the capacity of finance to execute its crucial functions. 
That liquidity crisis and the state’s response can be understood as a sign that an 
anchoring conception of fundamental value needs to be re-established for the 
commensuration of capital to be a sustainable project (Bryan & Rafferty, 2013: 
147). 
Bryan and Rafferty argue that such an anchor is provided by the Federal Reserve 
operating to ensure a rate of return by acting as market marker of last resort (Bryan & 
Rafferty, 2013: 149). This chapter will attempt to take this argument one step further 
and argue that this ‘anchoring conception of fundamental value’ is physically embodied 
in the U.S. government helping to facilitate the creation of collateralisable assets. Such 
collateral then acts as the ‘safe store of value’ or ‘anchor’ which agents need within 
financial markets. Indeed, collateral provides security for counter parties who - through 
their transactions with each other - engage in the process of competitive calculation. In 
over the counter derivative markets - a setting in which competitive calculation occurs - 
collateral is often held by a third party. The idea is that in the event that a counter-party 
fails, the other party will have access to such collateral (Gorton, 2010: 24-25). At the 
end of 2013, 91 per cent of over-the-counter derivatives were subject to a collateral 
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agreement (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2014: 3). The extensive 
use of collateral in ‘anchoring’ both the flow of credit and competitive valuation in the 
modern capitalist system puts pressure on its supply.   While it is true that such assets 33
can be reused or rehypothecated for use in other transactions, the depth of these markets 
from which assets can be drawn has become a relevant concern (Bank for International 
Settlements: Committee on the Global Financial System, 2001: 2-3; Caballero, 2006: 2).  
3.2 Defining Collateral within a Minsky -Keynes Asset Pricing Framework 
Recent interest in the supply of financial collateral has sparked debate amongst scholars 
as to the characteristics of these assets (Capel, 2011: 16; Hill, 2014: 7-8).  This chapter 
will apply the Minsky-Keynes asset pricing framework in order to provide an 
alternative definition. Recall that the expected total rate of return attaching to an asset 
can be described using the following notation:  
 R = y + a + l - c 
To apply this schema, one must determine how the relevant factors in the equation apply 
to the creation of collateral. A starting point for such an exploration has been given by 
Hill who - when reporting for the the International Capital Market Association 
European Repo Council - stated that: 
  
 “In many ways, collateral has become the new cash, underpinning the smooth 
 functioning of funding and capital markets and in turn, providing the basis for 
 economic growth” (Hill, 2014: 3). 
Underpinning this statement is a recognition that collateral can be converted quickly 
into cash for those seeking to borrow. The question that therefore must be posed then, is 
what makes lenders confident and willing to distribute liquidity on the basis of such 
 Indeed, demand for collateralisable assets does not relate solely to their potential use as 33
collateral. Agents can choose to hold such assets because of the qualities they embody
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collateral? It is clear from the outset that lenders do not want exposure to the specific 
asset form the collateral happens to be in. Rather, they hold it as a guarantee that given 
the transaction’s failure, they will have recourse to an asset which will allow them the 
scope to transfer their wealth into another form. From this point then, we can determine 
how the factors in the equation apply when it comes to defining collateral. Firstly, the 
asset must be sufficiently liquid. That is, it must be easily marketable with little sacrifice 
to its prevailing market price. Secondly, the asset’s expected appreciation must have 
attached to it, relatively little volatility. In addition, the asset’s explicit yield - if it is 
associated with one - must be stable. Combined, these elements amount to the defining 
characteristic of collateral-like assets: their perceived safety as a store of value.  34
Indeed, this elucidation makes clear why cash is often used as collateral in derivative 
markets. While a is not static due to inflation, it is stable enough through time to enable 
cash to act as collateral for a certain time period. The asset is also highly liquid and has 
no explicit yield, the change of which could compromise stable expectations 
surrounding the two aforementioned factors. 
Much of the above analysis is a ‘snap-shot’ view of what defines an asset as collateral-
like. Crucially, for an asset to practically act as collateral, it must continue to hold these 
qualities in the eyes of market actors through time. This of course, then involves the 
influence of expectations formed in uncertainty. For assets to be considered 
collateralisable, both actors party to the transaction must expect that the asset will retain 
collateral-like qualities in the future. In a context of uncertainty, this relies on the 
application of current expectations to the future (Minsky, 2008a: 64-65; Keynes, 1937: 
213-214) . If such expectations are invalidated by the unfolding of time, then assets that 
were previously considered good collateral can suddenly lose their capacity to be 
characterised as such. This is something which has been recognised by Capel who 
writes: 
 There are market based mechanisms by which lenders can compensate for the risk which 34
attaches to collateral. For example, a lender may attach a ‘haircut’ to a repo transaction (Gorton, 
2010: 16-17). This means that the cash offered is less than the stated market value of the asset 
that is being used as collateral. 
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 …there is a continuum of different collateral options available and - moreover 
 - the market perceptions of these options change continuously (Capel, 2011: 16). 
Thus, the Kaleckian principle - of capitalist agents creating the means of their own 
success - can be applied to schemas of collateral. Any asset can take form as collateral if 
there is an alignment of expectations surrounding the collateral-like qualities of such 
assets. This is a key point, because it indicates the possibility of financial agents 
creating high quality collateral separately from any state authority. The next section of 
this chapter will contend that such private creation took place with particular reference 
to the Mortgage Backed Security market. 
3.3 Mortgage Backed Securities and the Demand for Collateral Pre-Crisis 
In 2001, the Bank of International Settlements reported that: 
 …securities markets - for fixed income instruments as well as for   
 equities - continue to grow strongly worldwide, thereby increasing the pool 
 of assets available as collateral 
 (Bank for International Settlements: Committee on the Global Financial System, 
 2001: 9). 
  
Fixed income securities are loans which are packaged as financial instruments and sold 
to investors who are then able to access the income stream associated with the 
underlying asset (Noeth & Sengupta, 2011bb: 8-9). The innovation was arguably one 
made by the government sponsored enterprises - Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - who 
dominated the securitisation market from the 1970s. In the early 2000s, however, 
private label securitisation of mortgages began to grow and eventually dominate 
issuance (Simkovic, 2013: 235-240). As of 2006, a year before the crisis, 56 per cent of 
MBS issued was private label, meaning that it did not attract the explicit or implicit 
guarantee of a government sponsored enterprise (Freddie Mac, 2015b). In attempting to 
account for the rise of securitisation, a popular interpretation has been to argue that 
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MBS offered a store of wealth for the capital flowing into the United States at an 
attractive yield (Rajan, 2005). As a consequence, demand for such instruments rose. 
This, however, is only one side of the story. Many financial assets  are expected to offer 
investors a high yield. What was behind the demand for MBS specifically, was its 
transformation into an asset class with collateral-like qualities.  
If we think about a mortgage from a perspective informed by the Minsky-Keynes asset 
pricing framework, it is clear that its capacity to act as collateral is limited. Firstly, such 
assets are not readily marketable as they cannot be sold quickly and with little sacrifice 
to market price. This is because before an agent purchases such an asset, they will need 
information about the borrower and their capacity to meet payments on time. Such 
information gathering takes time and therefore makes the asset fairly illiquid. 
Furthermore, the expected explicit yield will fluctuate depending on the changing 
circumstances of the borrower in question and their ability to guarantee the explicit 
yield. Therefore, mortgage loans do not represent a stable source of value. To become 
collateralisable, such loans went through an intermediation process. Prior to the crisis, 
this involved the originator of the mortgage selling the loan to a Special Purpose 
Vehicle, which is a conduit of a dealer-bank (large investment banks, permitted to trade 
directly with the Federal Reserve). It is here that the cashflows from these loans were 
packaged into tranches. Tranches are essentially varying claims to an income stream 
associated with a pool of loans. It is this innovation of tranching that added stability to 
the explicit yield associated with holding claims to a mortgage loan. In holding title to 
the income stream associated with a senior tranch (or AAA rated tranch), investors were 
aware that any losses that accrued to the pool of loans as a result of default would be 
borne by those who had secondary claims to the collection of assets (Pozsar, 2008: 
13-14; Noeth & Sengupta: 10-12; Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcrat & Bosky, 2013: 3-10). 
 It was this perceived certainty around the explicit yield of MBS that drove an increase 
in the marketability of these assets. Stable expectations surrounding y gave agents the 
confidence to trade the asset in ever increasing numbers, improving l. Expected stability 
surrounding  y and l then informed an expectation amongst market actors that the 
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volatility associated with a also remained low. Thus, through tranching, MBS as an 
asset class became collateral-like in the eyes of market actors. This then resulted in an 
expansion of demand for MBS, because - as noted above - collateralisable assets can be 
used in a variety of ways by financial agents. This ended up driving increased demand 
for the source material of MBS; the underlying loans themselves. As has been well 
expressed by many scholars, originators responded to this demand by seeking to expand 
the mortgage market on the basis of eased financing conditions (Pozsar, 2008: 15; 
Simkovic, 2013: 237-242). The consequent increase in mortgage originations can be 
attributed in part to these favourable financing conditions, but also to the fact that house 
prices were widely expected to appreciate. The expected rate of return from exposure to 
real estate was therefore high, inducing households into the relevant portfolio decisions 
needed to both provide MBS source material and ensure the continued appreciation of 
real estate. 
3.4 Collateral in Crisis 
Chapter Two provided an account of the collapse in the MBS market that took place in 
the crisis. As such, only a brief overview will be given here.  At the outset of the crisis, 
only sub-prime securities were failing to deliver an explicit yield. The tranching system 
for the wider MBS market therefore may have protected investors and ensured that the 
expected explicit yield of the assets were realised. The tranching system was never fully 
tested, however, because the marketability of the asset class as a whole collapsed. This 
is because the extent to which firms were exposed to the deterioration of sub-prime 
securities was unknown (Gorton & Metrick, 2012: 447). This led to an expectation 
amongst repo investors that borrowers would be undertaking fires sales of securities in 
light of the losses that were accruing from sub-prime (Gorton, 2010: 132-134). As a 
consequence, these investors anticipated a potential decline in the marketability of MBS 
as a whole, due to the sudden increase in sellers in comparison to buyers. Changing 
expectations regarding the marketability of these assets drove an increase in haircuts. 
This then lead to a complete collapse in the marketability of MBS as an asset class and 
therefore the price of these assets trended dramatically downwards. This was in part due 
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to the fact that - in a context of collapsing market liquidity - marketability became the 
dominant factor informing the expected rate of return of financial assets. As soon as this 
was seen to be compromised, interest in the asset class as a whole collapsed, leading to 
the imbalance of buyers over sellers that informed the precipitous decline in prices. In 
this sense, it was an alignment of expectations surrounding both the importance and 
absence of marketability that was behind the fall of MBS in the crisis.  
Once the perceived qualities of an asset class have transformed in such a way, it is 
extremely unlikely that expectations will re-align to restore its collateral-like qualities. 
Part of the problem lies with the nature of expectation formation. As we know from 
Minsky, expectations differ from agent to agent and are likely to change. Due to the 
added pressures of competitive valuation, such changes are mediated day to day and are 
immediately reflected in market prices. As a consequence, the market - left to its own 
devices - is often unable to align expectations surrounding the marketability, 
appreciation and explicit yield of specific asset classes. Given these difficulties, U.S 
government action was needed to guide and support the capacity of financial markets to 
create collateralisable assets.
3.5 Quantitative Easing, Collateral and Households 
Restoring the financial system’s capacity to create collateralisable assets from the 
mortgage market has derived from a  partnership between governmental regulation and 
private portfolio decision making. Through this partnership, stable expectations 
surrounding the collateral-like qualities of MBS has been restored. The importance of a 
governmental presence in the MBS market is immediately evident when considering the 
depressed private-label securitisation market. 
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Figure Eleven: MBS Issuance Volume as of 30 June 2015
Source: Freddie Mac, 2015b. 
Figure Twelve: MBS Issuance Volume (Trillions of Dollars as of 30 June 2015) 
Source: Freddie Mac, 2015b. 
As is shown above, MBS has been reinvigorated as an asset class through the expansion 
of the GSE and Ginnie Mae securities market.  The reason for this is that the eligibility 35
matrix for these loans was a good basis upon which to rebuild expectations regarding 
the collateral-like qualities of MBS. This is because of the traditionally higher 
underwriting standards applied to these loans which ensured that during the crisis, GSE 
loans performed significantly better than non-GSE loans (Simkovic, 2013: 242-244). 
This may seem to contradict the last chapter which showed that GSEs can facilitate the 
 This is akin to a governmental presence, considering that Ginnie Mae is directly controlled by 35
the government and both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are under governmental conservatorship  
(U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2015g).
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distribution of loans to households with quite low credit scores. While this is true, in 
reality there are mechanisms in place to restrict loan distribution. For example, with a 
debt-to income (DTI) ratio of 45 per cent, the required credit score for a Fannie Mae 
backed loan can move up to 700 if the Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV), is greater than 75 per 
cent (Fannie Mae, 2015a).   Thus, the very eligibility matrix for these loans works to 36
partially restrict financing for some low to middle income households. 
Firstly, as was shown in chapter two, high debt to income ratios are disproportionately 
found with low and middle income households. In addition, at the end of 2014, at least 
35.49 per cent of American households had an LTV above 75 per cent (Gudell, 2015) . 
As Guddell notes, such LTV ratios are not distributed evenly amongst the American 
public and are most likely to be held by those with homes on the low to mid range of the 
price scale (2015).  However, it is arguable that the FHA programme  and therefore 37
Ginnie Mae, will support households with higher LTV and DTI ratios. But as was 
mentioned in chapter three, borrowers of FHA loans have to pay a premium into the 
fund from which insurance payments are made by the U.S. government (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2015c).   The key point here, is that 38
GSE and even Ginnie Mae backed loans, are not social welfare programmes. Rather, 
these loans are distributed on the basis of households’ capacity to support the 
governmental guarantees that attach to MBS either explicitly - by providing the funds 
that go towards insurance payments - or by means of the underlying quality of the loans 
themselves. Because of this, the underwriting standards for such loans are relatively 
strict and therefore a good basis upon which to re-establish stable expectations 
surrounding the explicit yield of MBS. 
 A debt to income ratio is the percentage of the borrower’s income that goes towards payment 36
of all debt obligations, including the mortgage that is being applied for. A loan to value ratio is 
the price of the mortgage divided by the value of the property.
 Because low to middle income households that have not experienced extensive house price 37
gains, they will bear a larger proportion of LTV scores above 75 per cent. If house prices 
increase, then household LTV’s decrease.
 It would be amiss not to highlight that the U.S. administration has sought to confront this 38
issue by lowering insurance premiums which attach to new FHA loans (Soergel, 2015).
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In the post-crisis world then, the private guarantees of explicit yield offered by the 
tranching system have been supplanted by governmental regulation and guarantees 
surrounding the mortgage market. This has become the basis upon which private 
originators have been able to take portfolio decisions which facilitate the creation of 
collateralisable assets. Indeed, that 74 per cent of Fannie and Freddie loans are going to 
households with credit scores of over 720 cannot be explained singularly by virtue of 
the eligibility matrix construct (U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2015f: 12-13). 
Rather, it is this matrix in combination with the conservative attitudes of financial 
agents that has created such financing conditions, in order to induce stable expectations 
surrounding the expected explicit yield of MBS. However, this kind of government 
supported portfolio decision making has come at the expense of facilitating low to 
middle income household access to the mortgage market. For, distributing loans to 
households with weak balance sheets means accepting the possibility that they will not 
be able to service the loan. Such practices are unsuited to a context where stable 
expectations surrounding y are being rebuilt. This lends support to the argument that 
household access to financing in the recovery has become a function of the capacity of 
this group to help facilitate the creation of collateralisable assets.  
With expectations surrounding the explicit yield of MBS in place, the Federal Reserve 
has acted to guarantee the marketability of agency MBS, thereby ensuring the asset’s 
collateral-like qualities. This contention conflicts with analysis which suggests that the 
Quantitative Easing programme has played a role in depriving finance of collateral-like 
assets through its large scale purchase of Treasury securities (Singh, 2013). However, by 
acting as the primary market maker for the asset class as a whole, Quantitative Easing 
has actively supported the capacity for MBS to act as collateral. Thus, while the 
regulation of the U.S. mortgage market has helped to restore expectations regarding the 
expected yield of agency MBS, Quantitative Easing has crucially ensured the 
marketability of such assets. 
Therefore, on the basis of governmental support of both y and l, there has been an 
alignment of expectations surrounding the collateral quality of agency MBS. Evidence 
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for this can be found in the consequent use of such assets in the repo market. Current 
estimates put the size of the repo market at approximately $3.0 trillion (Copeland, 
Davis, LeSueur, & Martin, 2014)  . Triparty repo agreements, which make up the 39
majority of this market, use agency backed MBS for  32 per cent of the collateral posted 
(Toomey, Podziemska, & Pallotta, 2015: 1). It is clear then, that agency MBS are 
contributing to the depth of collateral-like assets within the financial system. These 
assets have therefore become part of the solution to the search for an ‘anchor of value’ 
that Bryan and Rafferty discuss. This has required the participation of the U.S. 
government, which has placed itself as the ultimate arbiter of inducing stable 
expectations surrounding these assets through time. It is upon this basis that financial 
agents have taken the portfolio decisions which have enabled the creation of collateral, 
thereby helping to ensure its continued supply. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 Now is an apt time to return to the quote by Ben Bernanke detailed in the introduction 
of this work. In this quote, Bernanke argued that by supporting finance, one of the aims 
of Quantitative Easing was to support households.  The point of this chapter has not 
been to question the sincerity of that belief. It has, however, demonstrated that in reality, 
the relationship Bernanke highlights has operated inversely. For, Quantitative Easing 
helped enable households to directly support finance. In partnership with other 
government programmes, Quantitative Easing established the basis upon which 
financial agents could make portfolio decisions which created collateralisable assets 
from household liabilities. This was achieved through guaranteeing the explicit yield 
and marketability of agency backed MBS. This has helped to restore finance’s capacity 
to undertake credit distribution and participate in asset price formation, thereby 
supporting the recovery of the system as a whole. However, it has also nurtured a 
relationship between finance and households, based upon the capacity of households to 
provide finance with the basis of collateral assets. It therefore has made household 
 Such estimates remain conservative as only the activities of primary dealers are considered 39
(Copeland, Davis, LeSueur, & Martin, 2014).
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wealth recovery subservient to the imperatives of finance. The nature of this 
relationship accounts for the limited impact QE has had on low to middle income 
household wealth. Because this group often cannot provide the source material for 
collateral-like assets, there has been limited attempts to improve their access to 
financing. As has been shown in previous chapters, such restricted financing impacts 
negatively on investment and therefore the appreciation in housing assets that these 
households rely on for wealth gains. The next chapter of this thesis will seek to draw out 
the effect of limited household wealth recovery on other aspects of the prevailing 
system. In doing so, this chapter will facilitate a better understanding of the wider 
implications associated with QE’s impact on American households.  
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Chapter Four 
Implications: Household Wealth and the Continuing 
Recovery 
This last chapter will consider the wider implications of Quantitative Easing’s impact 
for the wider recovery of the American capitalist system. It will do so by firstly 
demonstrating that the increasing wealth of households has an important impact on 
aggregate demand conditions. For, through wealth gains, households become more 
willing to spend a greater proportion of their income and take on liabilities to facilitate 
consumption. Following on from this, it will be shown that debt-led consumption was 
inhibited by falling household wealth during the crisis. Furthermore, Quantitative 
Easing has not succeeded in enabling the recovery of debt-led consumption in the years 
following the crisis. This is because it has not impacted sufficiently upon the wealth of 
households most likely to consume out of gains to net worth. As a consequence, demand 
conditions have not been conducive to a recovery in capital investment to pre-crisis 
levels. This analysis will be used as a basis upon which this chapter will make its key 
contention: that the roles households have been expected to occupy in the recovery lie in 
tension with each other. In short, it will be shown that households’ capacity to act as a 
source of collateral for finance has come at the expense of their capacity to engage in 
debt-led consumption. From this point, the chapter will move to consider how this 
tension may be resolved. 
4.1 Debt-Led Aggregate Demand Before the Crisis 
The first section of this thesis will show how rising house prices have historically 
related to the consumption of American households. We can gain a glimpse of what has 
happened to house prices through the SCF. According to the Survey, between 1989 and 
2007 the median price of  the primary residence for households in the lowest quintile 
rose by 80 percent, the second saw an increase of 44.5 per cent and the third 50.8 per 
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cent (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 583). Such high increases occurred through all income 
quintiles. Rising house prices consequently drove an overall increase in wealth. This is 
not surprising when considering that such assets make up the lions share of  most 
households’ net worth (Yellen, 2014).
Figure Thirteen: Median Value of Net Worth (Thousands of 2013 US Dollars) 
Source: SCF Chartbook 2014, p. 43. 
Yet, households in the second income quintile experienced almost no growth in net 
worth from 1989-2007. Thus, a disclaimer must be made. The following analysis will 
not contend that the ‘wealth effect’ can totally account for consumption trends in the 
pre-crisis period. It will, however, argue that it was an important factor. In attempting to 
configure the impact of wealth on consumption, it is important to recognise that from 
the 1970s wages departed from productivity. As a consequence, incomes have been 
stagnant for the vast majority of American households (Palley, 2015: 6-7; Setterfield, 
2013: 158-166). The trend since 1989 is revealed by Figure 14. 
Income 
Quintile
Year 0-19.9 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
1989 3.3 43.6 75.3 120.2 238.6 702.2
1992 6.4 45.1 64.3 123.0 188.0 590.9
1995 9.1 50.9 70.5 115.5 194.4 539.7
1998 8.3 47.4 76.3 160.5 269.4 646.6
2001 10.3 49.1 83.6 189.5 345.6 1094.7
2004 9.2 41.6 88.7 197.2 386.8 1146.4
2007 9.1 42.4 98.9 231.1 399.9 1256.4
% Change 
from 
1989-2007
+139.6 -0.4 +30.4 + 40.4 + 74.6 +72.8
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Figure Fourteen: Mean Value of Before-tax family Income by Percentile of Income 
Source: SCF Chartbook 2014, p. 7. 
According to standard Kaleckian assumptions, stagnant incomes within the United 
States should have resulted in declining consumption. The  relevant question, therefore, 
is how in the face of this trend, consumption by American households was maintained 
and even extended (Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013: 132-133; Foster & Magdoff, 2009: 36). 
The answer lies in the development of a debt-led consumption regime characterised by 
extended levels of debt and the declining savings of households  (Cynamon & Fazzari, 
2008: 12-18; 2013: 142-149; Foster & Magdoff, 2009: 33-38; Palley, 2015: 17). Both 
trends are captured below in Figures 15 and 16. 
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Figure Fifteen: Household Debt and Disposable Income (Billions of Dollars, 
Quarterly): 1989-2014.  40
!  
Source: US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Research, 2015a, 2015b. 
Figure Sixteen: Personal Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income: 
1989-2007  
!  
Source: The Federal Reserve, 2015. 
 In the above measure, disposable income refers to the after-tax income of persons and non-40
profit corporations. Readers will note the discrepancy between this graph which shows rising 
disposable income, and the last which showed stagnation in before tax income for all but the top 
two quintiles. However, the upward trend in the second graph reflects the gains made by the top 
two income quintiles and in no way conflicts with the first.
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Let us analyse the rising debt trend first. When seeking to breakdown the constituent 
elements of household debt, Montgomerie has demonstrated that along with an 
expansion of mortgage debt, revolving - or credit card debt - also increased in the 
United States. From 2000 to 2006, the average percentage of credit card debt to nominal 
GDP was 18.74 per cent. Between 1980 and 1990, it was 13.71 per cent (Montgomerie, 
2007: 6). Furthermore, evidence from the SCF suggests that low to middle income 
households were implicated in this trend. As of 2007, 25.76 per cent of the lowest 
quintile had credit card liabilities, with 39.5 per cent of the second and 54.8 per cent of 
the third also owing (The Federal Reserve, 2014: 1158; Soederberg, 2014: 93). The 
mean value of these balances increased by 184.8 per cent, 97.5 per cent and 96.6 per 
cent for each quintile respectively in the period from 1989 to 2007 (The Federal 
Reserve, 2014: 1158). 
With this in mind, we can apply a Minskyan understanding of liability structures in 
order to enable a deeper understanding of what enabled debt-led consumption to occur. 
In attempting to comprehend debt-led consumption, some have argued that increased 
consumption through debt reflects households’ willingness to keep up with social norms 
(Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013: 141-142). This may indeed partly explain the trend from a 
sociological perspective. However, in order for this desire to be met, there must be an 
alignment of expectations between those extending liabilities and households. Simply 
put, both parties must have a clear expectation that the debt will be serviced. Otherwise, 
the expected rate of return for extending such liabilities would presumably be 
compromised and households would be unwilling to take on debt in the first place. In a 
context where incomes are stagnant it is unclear why such expectations would be 
formed. The answer here is twofold. Firstly, credit card debt, like mortgage debt, was 
securitised in a tranching system. For the issuers then, part of the total rate of return for 
issuing debt lied in the capacity to sell these instruments. The implications have been 
well captured by Montgomerie: 
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In their efforts to secure investors for annual (or bi-annual) ABS issues, 
consumer credit portfolio managers are primarily focused on capturing, or 
creating, persistent revolving debtors  (Montgomerie, 2007: 12). 
That the rate of return attaching to such operations relied on expanding issuance may 
help to explain the willingness of such agents to extend debt to households in a context 
of stagnant incomes. 
However, this does not account for households’ willingness to expand the liabilities on 
their own balance sheet. This can be explained - in part- by virtue of the increasing asset 
prices seen over the same period. For, as was made clear in chapter two, expectations 
surrounding the positive rate of return attaching to an asset drive a willingness to take 
on increased carrying costs in order to finance its acquisition. While Minsky applies this 
concept to explain the development of leverage in firms’ balance sheets over time, it can 
easily be appropriated to households (Cynamon & Fazzari, 2008: 21-24). 
Due to stagnant incomes, extending consumption comes with an additional cost, which 
is the price of credit. This is where the appreciation of home prices is important. For, 
expected appreciation of assets on a household’s balance sheet can justify the taking on 
of additional liabilities to finance both the asset itself and further consumption. Of 
course, the link between household asset prices and consumer credit is indirect. A more 
direct causal chain can be established by analysing the trends in cash out home equity 
financing, where households borrow directly against the equity contained in their home 
to access cash. According to Freddie Mac, the peak in cash-out refinancing volume out 
of prime loans was $99 billion in 2006. In comparison the relevant figure sat at $6 
billion 1993 (Freddie Mac, 2015a). Furthermore, Mian and Sufi show that such 
refinancing was used to consume, especially amongst low to middle income households 
(Mian & Sufi, 2014b: 1-5) . In addition, the effect of wealth on consumption does not 41
have to be singularly analysed with reference to household willingness to take on 
 Mian and Sufi  define low income households as those with a $50 000 income or less. These 41
scholars attempt to link cash-out equity financing to consumption by way of increasing auto-
loans in particular (2014: 1-5).
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liabilities. For, in the expectation that home prices will increase, households can 
dedicate a greater part of their income to consumption on the basis that increasing asset 
prices will compensate for this decision. This in part, accounts for the decline in savings 
as a percentage of disposable income.  Thus, expected increases in asset prices can 42
clearly drive household willingness to dedicate a greater proportion of their income to 
consumption or to take on liabilities in order to do so. Both phenomena are constituent 
aspects of the debt-led aggregate demand phenomenon. 
4.2 American Households, Weak Balance Sheets and Consumption in Crisis 
Chapter Two demonstrated that declining house prices devastated the wealth of 
households who had little access to other assets and were highly leveraged. This section 
will now seek to analyse the relationship between declining consumption and this 
phenomenon. That consumption was affected by the combination of house price decline 
and relatively high degrees of leverage amongst households has been demonstrated by 
Mian and Sufi. These authors take a sample of counties in the United States. They then 
split this sample into deciles based on ‘…the increase in the household debt-to-income 
ratio from 2002 to 2006’ (Mian & Sufi, 2011). At this point they select high debt and 
low debt counties. They then show that when house prices fell in high debt counties, 
consumption fell dramatically.  In comparison, these scholars show that consumption 43
within low debt counties was not implicated to the same extent (Mian & Sufi, 2011; 
2014a: 41-45). Thus, Mian and Sufi succeed in demonstrating that highly leveraged 
households were behind a large part of the decline in consumption seen post-crisis.  A 44
large reason for this is the collapse in wealth brought on by the extent of the decline in 
house prices combined with the leverage factor.  
 Of course, the decline in saving will be both a function of the need to service debt used to 42
consume and the use of a greater proportion of income to directly facilitate such consumption. 
 Mian and Sufi focus in particular on durable consumption as represented in auto loans (2011).43
 This is something that the IMF is also beginning to accept. For example, see (International 44
Monetary Fund, 2012: 96-98). 
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The effects of such a decline in wealth on consumption can be appreciated by utilising 
the Minskyan understanding of liability structures.  Because highly leveraged 
households had the equity on their balance sheets wiped out, they were forced to devote 
a higher percentage of their income to deleveraging in an attempt to restore their 
balance sheets. That such deleveraging has occurred is revealed by the table below. In 
addition to this imperative, household access to credit - which was being used to 
consume - declined as credit markets collapsed (Mian & Sufi, 2013b: 1690). Thus, as 
finance’s willingness to distribute credit instruments dissipated and asset prices 
collapsed, so, too, did the sustainability of the household liability structures which had 
been fuelling the debt-led consumption regime. 
Figure Seventeen: Mean Value of Debt for Families with Holdings (Thousands of 
2013 US Dollars) 
Source: SCF Chartbook 2014, p. 836. 
Income 
Quintile
Year 0-19.9 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
2001 21.9 36.5 61.7 99.3 145.4 278.8
2004 30.3 51.6 86.2 134.3 192.9 365.6
2007 35.7 49.2 90.4 157.0 231.9 386.9
2010 53.3 55.8 94.0 138.7 203.7 405.3
2013 37.7 48.8 70.9 122.9 201.9 357.5
% Change 
from 
2001-2010
+ 105.5 + 91.5 +48.6 +40.4 +40.7 +41.7
% Change 
from 
2010-2013
-29.3 -12.5 -24.6 -11.4 -0.9 -11.8
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4.3 Quantitative Easing, Financial Markets and Aggregate Demand 
QE has played a role in enabling households with the capacity to generate the basis of 
collateral for finance. However, this has come at the expense of facilitating households’ 
capacity to resume debt-led consumption. This is because, as has been shown, financial 
markets have only worked to support  the  wealth recovery of households with balance 
sheets which have a large exposure to financial assets or have the capacity to support 
collateral creation. This has had large implications for consumption because of varying 
marginal propensities to use increases in net wealth to consume. Indeed, Mian Sufi and 
Rao state that: 
…the MPC out of housing net wealth is much higher for poorer households, 
households with higher leverage and households that are more likely to be 
underwater.’ (Mian, Rao & Sufi, 2013b: 4).
The analysis put forth so far in this chapter makes clear why this is the case. It is low to 
middle income households - and even those stretching into the higher income sphere - 
that have relied on wealth as a basis to consume in the face of stagnating incomes. Thus, 
by working to disproportionately benefit the wealth of higher income households, 
Quantitative Easing may have inhibited a wider recovery in demand conditions within 
the prevailing system. For, without increasing wealth, it is clear that a large proportion 
of American households may lack the capacity to increase consumption. The 
implications for capital investment trends will now be discussed. 
4.4 Quantitative Easing, Consumption and Investment Since the Crisis 
The link between Quantitative Easing and investment is most directly encompassed in 
its impact on the borrowing costs of firms. As shown in Chapter Two, the programme 
has impacted on the yield of corporate bonds, easing the cost of financing for firms 
which have access to these markets. However, there have been questions raised in the 
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years since the crisis as to whether such eased financing conditions have been available 
to smaller firms of less than 500 employees who rely more heavily on bank credit 
(Firoozmand, Haxel, Jung & Suominen, 2015: 2). As was detailed in Chapter One, 
theoretically, Quantitative Easing should have placated banks’ liquidity preference as 
more central bank liabilities came to rest with them. The consequent re-emphasis on 
explicit yield as a factor going towards the expected rate of return on an asset, should 
have then led to an increased willingness on the part of banks to extend credit.  Despite 45
this, according to a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York cited by 
Firoozmand et al., smaller firms who are ‘discouraged’ or ‘debt averse’  still outweigh 
those who believe that their access to credit is sufficient (Firoozmand, Haxel, Jung, & 
Suominen, 2015: 11-12). 
Figure Eighteen: SMEs’ View of Availability of Credit in 2013-14 
  
Source: Firoozmand et al., 2015, p. 11-12. 
Smaller firms may have reason for complaint. Recent work by the Bank of International 
Settlements indicates that as of 2013, there was still a wide spread difference between 
policy rates - set by the Federal Reserve - and those offered by banks for small business 
loans (Illes & Lombardi, 2013: 58-59). Given that the liquidity preference of banks has 
 This is because the value of the implicit yield of an asset should decline as fears surrounding 45
liquidity shortages subside. 
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been met, other explanations have been presented for this phenomenon. Illes and 
Lombardi point to banks adjusting to new regulatory and capital requirement regimes. 
Alternatively, they also suggest that banks could have a ‘higher premium for risk’ 
following the crisis (Illes & Lombardi, 2013: 64-65). However, as was revealed in 
Chapter One, the availability of credit and the terms on which it is offered are often a 
function of aligning expectation formation between finance and firms regarding the rate 
of return on investment. In relation to capital investment, that rate of return is in large 
part determined by the expected explicit yield. This in turn, depends on actualised levels 
of demand based on consumption. Thus, the most relevant factor among conditions 
surrounding the supply of credit is the extent of demand perceived to exist in the system 
For, this validates both the investment project itself and the distribution of the liability 
to finance it.  
Therefore, that c is perceived to be beyond y for many small businesses is a result of 
both finance and firms’ dampened expectations surrounding the profitability and risk of 
the investment projects in question.  For this informs both an increase in c on the part of 
finance, and a decrease in y on the part of firms. Together, this lowers the demand price 
beyond that of the supply, inhibiting investment. Thus, the notion that weak investment 
can be explained by virtue of supply problems facing small firms is largely mistaken. . 46
If expanded investment was associated with a high expected total rate of return, there is 
a strong likelihood that portfolio decisions would align to support wider access to 
capital for smaller firms and more expansive investment would occur (Banerjee, 
Kearns, & Lombardi, 2013: 71). Alternatively, larger firms could seek to take advantage 
of these opportunities by funding such investment out of existing cash balances or 
making use of the low funding costs instigated by Quantitative Easing. As it is, 
however, real business fixed, non-residential investment remained depressed below pre-
crisis levels at the beginning of 2014. 
 This is especially the case when considering that the U.S. government has played an ‘anti-46
cyclical’ role in offering loans to small business in a wide variety of capacities (Firoozmand et 
al., 2015: 14-20).
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Figure Nineteen: Non-Residential Private Fixed Investment: Trends to 2014 
!  
Source: Pinto & Tevlin (2014). 
As can be seen from Figure 19, investment picked up at the start of the recovery, but 
increased at an average annual rate of only 4 per cent in 2012 and 2013. This - 
according to analysts at the Federal Reserve - is an unusually slow place during an 
expansion (Pinto & Tevlin, 2014). Furthermore, while net investment as a share of the 
capital stock has rebounded, it hovered at only around 1.5 per cent per year at the start 
of 2014 (Pinto & Tevlin, 2014). This can be explained by considering how consumption 
trends compare to those which have emerged out of crises in the past (Mian & Sufi, 
2014c).  
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Figure Twenty: Consumption Trends: Quarters Since Recession Began to Q1 2014  47
!
!  
 Services are products such as medical care and transportation that cannot be stored. Durable goods are 47
tangible products that can be stored or inventoried. Non-Durable Goods are tangible products that can be 
sold or inventoried and that are usable over a short time. These definitions derive from the National 
Income and Product Accounts that are the source of Mian and Sufi’s calculations. See (U.S. Department 
of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014).
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Source: Mian & Sufi, 2014c. 
It is clear then, that the low marginal propensity of high income households to consume 
out of wealth has resulted in a relatively muted response in consumption  following the 
crisis. This is something which is explicitly recognised by Mian and Sufi: 
 Similarly, the house price recovery from 2011 onwards did not contribute as 
 much to economic activity as the 02 to 06 housing gains. Our results suggest 
 that this might be because the borrowing channel was effectively shut to those 
 most responsive to house price gains. (Mian & Sufi, 2014b: 4). 
  
As was demonstrated in Chapter Two, the shut-down of the borrowing channel limits 
the wealth recovery of low to middle income household, by depressing residential  
investment and therefore house prices. This thesis has argued that such a ‘shut-down’ 
was an immediate function of the need for households to once again supply finance with 
the raw material for the creation of collateral. Taking a step back, then, we see that the 
relationship between finance and household portfolios has become central in 
determining the demand conditions firms respond to when investing. By failing to open 
up the mortgage market to a wide proportion of American households, finance portfolio 
decisions have inhibited the expansion of household wealth. As a consequence, 
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households have failed to resume debt-led consumption, placing a limit on the extent 
demand conditions have improved. This, then, accounts for the slowdown in investment 
as both firms and finance respond to such demand conditions when assessing  whether 
to shift their portfolios in a way which allows for  capital investment. As such, finance 
has failed to create the conditions for other firms’ profitability. This chain of events 
derives from the Kaleckian notion of capitalists creating the conditions for their own 
success. While it may make sense for finance to restrict their activities in such a way, 
such action has inhibited the creation of profit opportunities for other firms and 
therefore stymied the full recovery of capital investment. 
4.5 Speculating on the Future Positioning of Households Within American 
Capitalism 
At the core of the unusually weak investment recovery lies the contradictory roles 
households have been expected to occupy as facilitators of both collateral  creation and 
increased consumption. Indeed, the prioritisation of the former has ultimately come at 
the expense of the latter. The last part of this chapter will take some time to consider 
how this tension may be resolved. The first option seems to be embedded within the 
possibility of expanded investment. For, if this were to occur, there would be positive 
repercussions for household income. This may allow households to consequently repair 
their balance sheets. Such a ‘bottom-up’ approach would facilitate household re-
engagement with credit markets without finance necessarily having to decrease lending 
standards. This may then lead to more expansive but stable consumption patterns on the 
basis of increased income and wealth.  However, that this chain of events will be the 
path towards resolution of the aforementioned tension is unlikely.  
There is no doubt that the reasons for this are extremely complex and would involve 
consideration of many macroeconomic and historical factors.  As such, an attempt to 48
 For explorations of the reasons behind stagnant incomes and paths of investment see (Beitel, 48
2009). For an explanation situated within Post-Keynesian macroeconomic theory see Palley 
(2013). Examples of explanations focussing on the rise of the ‘rentier class’, and its impact on 
investment can be found in Girón & Chapoy (2012); Lavoie (2012); Watkins  (2010).
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give a comprehensive explanation will not be given here. However, within the confines 
of this thesis, a simple point contributing towards the debate can be made. A recovery 
which results in expansive household income would be inconsistent with the financial 
system that programmes such as Quantitative Easing have worked to restore. For, it will 
be recalled that QE, in partnership with government programmes and private portfolio 
decision making, has facilitated the creation of stable sources of value. This has allowed 
finance to both facilitate the flow of credit and participate in the process of competitive 
valuation. It is the process of competitive calculation in particular which makes a high-
income consumption regime unlikely. 
As was mentioned in the last chapter, Bryan and Rafferty highlight how finance, in the 
process of competitive calculation, has come to dominate the formation of asset prices. 
This has large implications for the investment process. For, it will be recalled that the 
expected rate of return on an investment project is compared with its prevailing supply 
price before it is purchased. For fixed investment in particular, the supply price will 
include the cost of production; the labour and raw materials or assets used in the 
production process. However, these asset prices are not static. In reality, they  are 
constantly being revalued on a day-to-day basis within financial markets (Bryan & 
Rafferty, 2006: 170-171).  In this sense, expectations formed in uncertainty are 
mediated against each other and reflected in prices continuously. The process of 
competitive calculation does not therefore remove uncertainty, but makes it a more 
tangible reality for firms. As such, firms are expected to recalibrate their investment 
decisions; comparing often their own perceived rate of return to asset prices formed in 
financial markets. The extension of this competitive logic has come to implicate 
households (as labour); the other constituent element of the supply price. As such, this 
group is now subject to the same mode of calculation, judged according to what they are 
able to contribute to the overall rate of return or profit for firms (Bryan & Rafferty, 
2006: 176). This  has, more often than not, placed downward pressure on the income of 
households,  something which has been reflected in the phenomenon of declining and 
stagnant incomes. 
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The above analysis is fairly abstract and, of course, this phenomenon has been allowed 
to occur in the context of  particular historical developments which have increased the 
power of  American finance (Konings, 2011). Nevertheless, such analysis does reveal 
that stagnant incomes have come to occupy a structurally important place in American 
capitalism, helping to facilitate the competitiveness of firms.  Of course, the ultimate 
profitability of firms also relies on the consumption of households. This is where, over 
the last thirty years, finance has filled the void. No more would households derive their 
increased capacity to consume from the firms they directly contributed to. Rather, that 
role was abrogated to finance, which facilitated both increasing asset prices and the 
extent households were able to leverage themselves against these prices to extend 
consumption.  
Thus, if leveraged household balance sheets were to retract or disappear, and income 
shares were to rise, we would clearly be dealing with an American capitalist system in 
transition. What appears more likely - given the nature of the recovery QE has in part 
engendered - is that the financial system will gradually come to facilitate the restoration 
of debt led consumption. This process is likely to begin in earnest as fears regarding 
sources of stable value in financial markets decline.  This may result in the search for 49
yield becoming once again paramount in the relationship between finance and 
households. Such a development could see finance become willing to engage in a 
broader expansion of liabilities to households - both on the consumer credit and 
mortgage fronts. This in itself would not be enough, however. As has been shown, 
households also need to be willing to take on such liabilities. This willingness could 
return by virtue of the wealth increases that could derive from eased financing 
conditions in the mortgage market. For, as has been shown repeatedly, lower financing 
costs can lead to wider investment and therefore increasing house prices. Given these 
wealth changes, households may once again become enabled with the capacity to re-
engage in debt-led consumption. Thus, the resolution to the aforementioned tension is 
most likely to be driven by the changing imperatives of finance as concern over 
 There has been some evidence put forth in the media that this may be occurring. See for 49
example Rennison & Nicolaou (2015)
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collateral supply diminishes.  It seems, therefore, that how households are positioned 50
within American capitalism is unlikely to change. Rather, the tension that has appeared 
post-crisis will dissipate with the progressive recovery of the financial system that QE 
has helped to engender. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The impact of Quantitative Easing on other aspects of the recovery reveals the 
contradictory role households have been expected to play in post-crisis American 
capitalism. Firstly, this group has been expected to facilitate the creation of stable 
sources of collateral. At the same point in time, these households have been relied upon 
to undertake debt-led consumption. Such consumption relies upon households spending 
a greater proportion of their income or taking on additional liabilities, on the basis of 
expected increases in wealth. However, Quantitative Easing operated to benefit 
household wealth to the extent that this group could support the imperative of collateral 
creation. This has come to disproportionately benefit households who have a relatively 
low marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. As a consequence, consumption has 
remained relatively muted in the years since the crisis. As such, this chapter has 
demonstrated that the nature of the prevailing recovery in investment can in part be 
explained through the failure of finance to enable low to middle income households to 
revitalise debt-led consumption. Despite this, it has been argued that debt-led 
consumption is unlikely be replaced by consumption out of increasing incomes. This is 
on the basis that the features of the financial system - which QE and other programmes 
have worked to restore - directly counteract that possibility. Rather, it is more likely that 
as the imperatives of finance change, so will its willingness to facilitate increasing 
house prices and the leverage households can therefore access to consume. 
 There is a question as to whether this kind of expansion will compromise the collateral-like 50
qualities of assets based on household liabilities. However, the likelihood of this occurring has 
been curtailed by the American government’s dedication to ensuring the existence of ‘stable 
value assets’. Any losses experienced by finance in this potential expansion back into the 
securities realm may therefore be more successfully localised. This is because agents now 
operate in the knowledge that the marketability and yield of collateral assets will be supported 
by the American government.
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explain the impact of Quantitative Easing upon 
low to middle income households. In working towards this goal, the actual impact of 
Quantitative Easing upon this group was empirically established in Chapter Two. In this 
chapter it was shown that Quantitative Easing has had an inequitable impact on 
American household wealth, disproportionately favouring higher income households. In 
order to account for this impact, the chapter proceeded to show that despite the eased 
financing conditions instigated by QE, mortgage access has remained restricted for low 
to middle income households. Restricted financing consequently led to depressed 
patterns of investment in real estate which inhibited the possibility of improvements in 
household wealth through increasing home prices. Chapter Three sought to explain this 
phenomenon of restrictive financing by showing that the portfolio decisions of finance 
in the mortgage market - supported by QE - were directed towards the imperative of 
collateral provision. This collateral underpinned the recovery of finance’s capacity to re-
engage with the process of asset pricing through competitive calculation and to 
distribute credit through wholesale funding markets. However, such portfolio decisions 
did not translate into positive outcomes for low to middle income households, for this 
precluded distributing mortgage instruments to households with weak balance sheets. 
As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, those with weak balance sheets are 
most likely to be low to middle income households. 
Thus, QE only benefitted households to the extent that this group were able to support 
the recovery of crucial elements of the financial system. The incapacity for some 
households to offer such support, has led to restrictive financing conditions, weak 
residential investment and therefore a lack of recovery in house prices for those reliant 
on this phenomenon for wealth gains.  While this may not in itself be surprising, it does 
encompass a direct challenge to the discourse that reverses the causality of this 
relationship and claims that QE was undertaken for the benefit of ordinary American 
households. As such, this thesis has clear political implications for those seeking to 
challenge a political narrative which places households as the direct beneficiaries of the 
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recovering financial system. At the time of writing, such challenges have been made 
empirically, by highlighting the inequitable effect of the financial recovery. However, 
this thesis  has gone further and provided an explanation for these empirical results. It 
has done so by revealing the existence of a relationship between households and 
finance, where benefits have been distributed to households on the basis of their 
capacity to facilitate financial recovery. By highlighting this relationship, the prevailing  
political narrative of Quantitative Easing can now be challenged on two bases. While 
the inequitable impact of QE undoubtedly should still be highlighted, this can now be 
supplemented with a critique of the relationship between households and finance which 
has perpetuated these inequitable outcomes. 
However, the implications of this work stretch beyond the political realm and into the 
methodological. For, it has provided an alternative approach to the study of programmes 
such as Quantitative Easing. This methodology, outlined in Chapter One, involved 
establishing an alternative conception of economic decision making and placing this 
within a systemic context. Firstly, the equation set out in Chapter One described the 
factors which go towards establishing the expected rate of return of an asset and 
therefore the decision to purchase it. It was made clear that such factors are considered 
in conditions of uncertainty, with some preferred over others depending on the context 
in which the portfolio decision is being made. Ultimately the portfolio decisions of 
different agents, informed by the rate of return equation, interact with each other to 
produce a flow of funds which constitutes investment. The particular dimensions and 
characteristics of that investment then come to impact back upon the agents making 
portfolio decisions in the first place. This is because aggregate investment conditions 
affect conditions of profitability and therefore the actual rate of return accruing to 
assets. However, this process does not occur in abstraction. This framework needs to be 
placed in a systemic context in order to understand the imperatives impacting upon 
portfolio decision making which may exist externally to the rate of return equation. In 
the context of this thesis, the wider imperatives of the financial system demanded the 
creation of collateralisable assets. This imperative then informed how finance made 
portfolio decisions in the mortgage market. Thus, by seeking to understand these 
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portfolio decisions in a systemic context, this thesis has been able to account for their 
consequences; the paths of investment which have ultimately impacted upon 
households. This kind of methodological approach is one which could be appropriated 
by other Political Economists seeking to understand the impact of  Quantitative Easing 
or other government programmes.  
The methodology outlined has allowed this thesis to extend itself in seeking to 
understand the implications of Quantitative Easing’s impact upon households for the 
wider recovery of American capitalism. For, the lack of wealth recovery amongst low to 
middle income households has lead to demand conditions which have not facilitated 
expansive capital investment. This is on the basis that debt-led consumption - which 
relies on expected wealth gains -  has been limited since the crisis. Thus, this thesis has 
shown that the story of the recovery so far has been one centred upon the tensions 
embedded in the relationship between finance and households. On the one hand, this 
relationship has helped to restore finance’s capacity to distribute credit and undertake 
the process of competitive calculation. On the other hand, this has come at the expense 
of enabling the recovery of debt-led consumption; a crucial feature of American 
capitalism, as it enables households to sustain higher levels of aggregate demand in the 
face of stagnant incomes. Thus, through exploring and explaining Quantitative Easing’s 
impact on households, this thesis has also achieved a supplementary purpose. For, it has 
highlighted the inability of Quantitative Easing to instigate a full recovery of the 
American capitalist system.  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